We discuss the implications on banks and the economy of prudential regulatory intervention to soften the treatment of non-performing exposures (NPEs) and ease bank capital buffers. We apply these easing measures on a sample of Globally Systemically Important Banks (G-SIBs) and show that these banks can play a constructive role in sustaining economic growth during the COVID-19 pandemic. In addition, an empirical analysis shows that prudential regulatory responses to COVID-19 along with high regulatory capital and low non-performing loans ratios are positively associated with economic growth. Thus, banks should maintain high capital ratios in the medium-term horizon to absorb future losses, as the effect of COVID-19 on the economy might take time to fully materialize.

We examine how individualism affects bank capital decisions worldwide and in the United States at the state level. Based on a sample of 7034 banks in 68 countries, we establish three major findings. First, individualism is negatively and significantly associated with bank regulatory capital, and the association is independent of the influence of formal institutional environments. Second, effective legal enforcement magnifies individualism's negative effect on bank regulatory capital. Finally, focusing on the United States, we also find that banks in individualistic states hold less regulatory capital than banks in collectivist states do. Effective state-level legal enforcement magnifies the effect of individualism. Our findings suggest that individualism constrains regulators, as regulatory guidelines or formal institutional factors operate very differently depending on the informal institutional environment.

Using a sample of banks operating in 24 countries, we provide robust evidence that stronger creditor rights are associated with higher capital adequacy ratios for conventional banks but not for Islamic banks. Such results suggest that, under stronger creditor protection, only the managers of conventional banks increase equity, presumably as a means of signalling better monitoring efforts and of avoiding loss of control. A possible reason for the finding that Islamic banks do not generally increase equity is that, under the profit loss sharing (PLS) principle, depositors share profits and losses with the bank. The role of creditor protection is hence irrelevant in an Islamic banking context. However, we show that in predominantly non-Muslim countries with less competitive markets, Islamic banks show a similar association between creditor rights and capital ratios as conventional banks.

We investigate whether and how political systems affect the financial soundness of conventional and Islamic banks. Using factors extracted from principal component analysis, we find that Islamic banks underperform their conventional counterparts in more democratic political systems but outperform them in hybrid and Sharia’a-based legal systems. The findings reflect the challenges Islamic banks face in Western countries in terms of perception, financial infrastructure, and regulatory constraints while mirroring the recognition of their specificities and their cultural and religious compliance with Sharia’a law in Muslim countries. The findings are robust to a battery of alternative estimation techniques and methods of correcting standard errors.