Towards developing a theory of systematic biases about strategies, I analyze strategic implications of a particular bias: wishful thinking about the strategies. Considering canonical state spaces for strategic uncertainty, I identify a player as a wishful thinker at a state if she hopes to enjoy the highest payoff that is consistent with her information about the others’ strategies at that state. I develop a straightforward elimination process that characterizes the strategy profiles that are consistent with wishful thinking, mutual knowledge of wishful thinking, and so on. Every pure-strategy Nash equilibrium is consistent with common knowledge of wishful thinking. For generic two-person games, I further show that the pure Nash equilibrium strategies are the only strategies that are consistent with common knowledge of wishful thinking, providing an unusual epistemic characterization for equilibrium strategies. I also investigate the strategic implications of rationality and ex-post optimism, the situation in which a player’s expected payoff weakly exceeds her actual payoff. I show that these strategic implications are generically identical to those of wishful thinking whenever each player’s payoff is monotone in others ’ strategies.

In sequential bargaining models without outside options, each player's bargaining power is ultimately determined by which player will make an offer and when. This paper analyzes a sequential bargaining model in which players may hold different beliefs about which player will make an offer and when. Excessive optimism about making offers in the future can cause delays in agreement. The main result states that, despite this, if players will remain sufficiently optimistic for a sufficiently long future, then in equilibrium they will agree immediately. This result is also extended to other canonical models of optimism.

Consider a group of individuals with unobservable perspectives (subjective prior beliefs) about a sequence of states. In each period, each individual receives private information about the current state and forms an opinion (a posterior belief). She also chooses a target individual and observes the target's opinion. This choice involves a trade‐off between well‐informed targets, whose signals are precise, and well‐understood targets, whose perspectives are well known. Opinions are informative about the target's perspective, so observed individuals become better understood over time. We identify a simple condition under which long‐run behavior is history independent. When this fails, each individual restricts attention to a small set of experts and observes the most informed among these. A broad range of observational patterns can arise with positive probability, including opinion leadership and information segregation. In an application to areas of expertise, we show how these mechanisms generate own field bias and large field dominance.

Rationalizability is a central solution concept of game theory. Economic models often have many rationalizable outcomes, motivating economists to use refinements of rationalizability, including equilibrium refinements. In this paper we try to achieve a general understanding of when this multiplicity occurs and how one should deal with it. Assuming that the set of possible payoff functions and belief structures is sufficiently rich, we establish a revealing structure of the correspondence of beliefs to sets of rationalizable outcomes. We show that, for any rationalizable action a of any type, we can perturb the beliefs of the type in such a way that a is uniquely rationalizable for the new type. This unique outcome will be robust to further small changes. When multiplicity occurs, then we are in a “knife-edge” case, where the unique rationalizable outcome changes, sandwiched between open sets of types where each of the rationalizable actions is uniquely rationalizable. As an immediate application of this result, we characterize, for any refinement of rationalizability, the predictions that are robust to small misspecifications of interim beliefs. These are only those predictions that are true for all rationalizable strategies, that is, the predictions that could have been made without the refinement.

We study the informational events that trigger equilibrium shifts in coordination games with incomplete information. Assuming that the distribution of the changes in fundamentals has fat tails, we show that majority play shifts either if fundamentals reach a critical threshold or if there are large common shocks, even before the threshold is reached. The fat-tail assumption matters because it implies that large shocks make players more unsure about whether their payoffs are higher than others. This feature is crucial for large shocks to matter.