This article studies the transmission of financial shocks in a model where corporate credit is intermediated via both banks and bond markets. In choosing between bank and bond financing, firms trade-off the greater flexibility of banks in case of financial distress against the lower marginal costs of large bond issuances. I find that, in response to a contraction in bank credit supply, aggregate bond issuance in the corporate sector increases, but not enough to avoid a decline in aggregate borrowing and investment. Keeping leverage constant while retiring bank debt would expose firms to a higher risk of financial distress; they offset this by reducing total borrowing. A calibration of the model to the Great Recession indicates that this precautionary mechanism can account for one-third of the total decline in investment by firms with access to bond markets.

In recent years, U.S. investment has been lackluster, despite rising valuations. Key explanations include growing rents and growing intangibles. We propose and estimate a framework to quantify their roles. The gap between valuations—reflected in average Q —and investment—reflected in marginal q —can be decomposed into three terms: the value of installed intangibles; rents generated by physical capital; and an interaction term, measuring rents generated by intangibles. The intangible related terms contribute significantly to the gap, particularly in fast‐growing sectors. Our findings suggest care in a pure‐rents interpretation, given the rising role of intangibles.

This paper uses new confidential Census data to revisit the relationship between firm size, cyclicality, and financial frictions. First, we find that large firms (the top 1 percent by size) are less cyclically sensitive than the rest. Second, high and rising concentration implies that the higher cyclicality of the bottom 99 percent of firms only has a modest impact on aggregate fluctuations. Third, differences in cyclicality are not simply explained by financing, and in fact appear largely unrelated to proxies for financial strength. We instead provide evidence for an alternative mechanism based on the industry scope of the very largest firms.

We study the effects of policies proposed to address “short-termism” in financial markets. We examine a noisy rational expectations model in which investors’ exposures and information about fundamentals endogenously vary across horizons. In this environment, taxing or outlawing short-term investment doesn’t negatively affect the information in prices about long-term fundamentals. However, such a policy reduces short- and long-term investors’ profits and utility. Changing policies about the release of short-term information can help long-term investors—an objective of some policy makers—at the expense of short-term investors. Doing so also makes prices less informative and increases costs of speculation. Received June 24, 2018; editorial decision February 19, 2019 by Editor Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh.

We provide evidence on the importance of coordination frictions in technology adoption, using data from a large provider of electronic wallets during the Indian demonetization. Exploiting geographical variation in exposure to the demonetization, we show that adoption of the wallet increased persistently in response to the large but temporary cash contraction, consistent with the predictions of a technology adoption model with complementarities. Model estimates indicate that adoption would have been 45% lower without complementarities. Our results illustrate how large but temporary interventions can help overcome coordination frictions, though we caution that such interventions may also exacerbate initial differences in adoption.