We document that most dispersion in marginal revenue products of inputs occurs across plants within firms rather than between firms. This is commonly thought to reflect misallocation: dispersion is “bad”. However, we show that eliminating frictions hampering internal capital markets in a multi-plant firm model may in fact increase productivity dispersion and raise output: dispersion can be “good”. This arises as firms optimally stagger investment activity across their plants over time to avoid raising costly external finance, instead relying on reallocating internal funds. The staggering in turn generates dispersion in marginal revenue products. We use U.S. Census data on multi-plant manufacturing firms to provide empirical evidence for the model mechanism and show a quantitatively important role for good dispersion. Since there is less scope for good dispersion in emerging economies, the difference in the degree of misallocation between emerging and developed economies looks more pronounced than previously thought.

The labor share in U.S. manufacturing declined from 61% in 1967 to 41% in 2012. The labor share of the typical U.S. manufacturing establishment, in contrast, rose by over 3 percentage points during the same period. Using micro-level data, we document five salient facts: (i) since the 1980s, there has been a dramatic reallocation of value added toward the lower end of the labor share distribution; (ii) this aggregate reallocation is not due to entry/exit, to “superstars” growing faster, or to large establishments lowering their labor shares, but is instead due to units whose labor share fell as they grew in size; (iii) low labor share (LL) establishments benefit from high revenue labor productivity, not low wages; (iv) they also enjoy a product price premium relative to their peers; and (v) they have only temporarily lower labor shares that rebound after five to eight years. This transient pattern has become more pronounced over time, and the dynamics of value added and employment are increasingly disconnected. Taken together, we interpret these facts as pointing to a significant role for demand-side forces.

We propose a new theory of price rigidity based on firms' Knightian uncertainty about their competitive environment. This uncertainty has two key implications. First, firms learn about the shape of their demand function from past observations of quantities sold. This learning gives rise to kinks in the expected profit function at previously observed prices, making those prices both sticky and more likely to reoccur. Second, uncertainty about the relationship between aggregate and industry‐level inflation generates nominal rigidity. We prove the main insights analytically and quantify the effects of our mechanism. Our estimated quantitative model is consistent with a wide range of micro‐level pricing facts that are typically challenging to match jointly. It also implies significantly more persistent monetary non‐neutrality than in standard models, allowing it to generate large real effects from nominal shocks.

This paper provides direct evidence that learning about demand is an important driver of firms’ dynamics. We present a model of Bayesian learning in which firms are uncertain about idiosyncratic demand in each market and update their beliefs as noisy information arrives. Firms update their beliefs to a given demand shock more, the younger they are. We test and empirically confirm this prediction, using the structure of the model, together with exporter-level data, to identify demand shocks and the firms’ beliefs about future demand. Consistent with theory, we also find the learning process to be weakened in more uncertain environments.

Macroeconomists traditionally ignore temporary price markdowns (“sales”) under the assumption that they are unrelated to aggregate phenomena. We revisit this view. First, we provide robust evidence from the U.K. and U.S. CPI micro data that the frequency of sales is strongly countercyclical, as much as doubling during the Great Recession. Second, we build a general equilibrium model in which cyclical sales arise endogenously as retailers try to attract bargain hunters. The calibrated model fits well the business cycle co-movement of sales with consumption and hours worked, and the strong substitution between market work and shopping time documented in the time-use literature. The model predicts that after a monetary contraction, the heightened use of discounts by firms amplifies the fall in the aggregate price level, attenuating by a third the one-year response of real consumption.