Unequal inheritance of material wealth is commonly considered a major cause of inequality in consumption. However, theoretical models of the intergenerational transmission of inequality by Becker, Blinder, and Ishikawa imply that unequal inheritance may either increase or reduce consumption inequality. Differences in inherited wealth resulting from unequal parental incomes increase inequality in recipients' consumption. However, unequal bequests caused by differences among families in the endowed ability of children or the costs of producing human capital are equalizing. Empirical results confirm these predictions: The inheritance received by children is inversely related to both children's income and parental education. Thus bequests are "compensatory" in that (ceteris paribus) low-income children inherit more than their advantaged contemporaries.

[Unequal inheritance of material wealth is commonly considered a major cause of inequality in consumption. However, theoretical models of the intergenerational transmission of inequality by Becker, Blinder, and Ishikawa imply that unequal inheritance may either increase or reduce consumption inequality. Differences in inherited wealth resulting from unequal parental incomes increase inequality in recipients' consumption. However, unequal bequests caused by differences among families in the endowed ability of children or the costs of producing human capital are equalizing. Empirical results confirm these predictions: The inheritance received by children is inversely related to both children's income and parental education. Thus bequests are "compensatory" in that (ceteris paribus) low-income children inherit more than their advantaged contemporaries.]

"This paper develops a model of the transmission of earnings, assets, and consumption from parents to descendants. The model assumes utility-maximizing parents who are concerned about the welfare of their children. The degree of intergenerational mobility is determined by the interaction of this utility-maximizing behavior with investment and consumption opportunities in different generations and with different kinds of luck. We examine a number of empirical studies for different countries. Regression to the mean in earnings in rich countries appears to be rapid. Almost all the earnings advantages or disadvantages of ancestors are wiped out in three generations." A comment by Robert J. Willis is included (pp. 40-7).

The theory of inequality and intergenerational mobility presented in this essay assumes that each family maximizes a utility function spanning several generations. Utility depends on the consumption of parents and on the quantity and quality of their children. The income of children is raised when they receive more human and nonhuman capital from their parents. Their income is also raised by their "endowment" of genetically determined race, ability, and other characteristics, family reputation and "connections," and knowledge, skills, and goals provided by their family environment. The fortunes of children are linked to their parents not only through investments but also through these endowments acquired from parents (and other family members). The equilibrium income of children is determined by their market and endowed luck, the own income and endowment of parents, and the two parameters, the degree of inheritability and the propensity to invest in children. If these parameters are both less than unity, the distribution of income between families approaches a stationary distribution. The stationary coefficient of variation is greater, the larger the degree of in-heritability and the smaller the propensity to invest in children. Intergenerational mobility measures the effect of a family on the well-being of its children. We show that the family is more important when the degree of inheritability and the propensity to invest are larger. If both these parameters are less than unity, an increase in family income in one generation has negligible effects on the incomes of much later descendants. However, the incomes of children, grandchildren, and other early descendants could significantly increase; indeed, if the sum of these parameters exceeds unity, the changes in income rise for several generations before falling, and the maximum increase in income could exceed the initial increase.

The theory of inequality and intergenerational mobility presented in this essay assumes that each family maximizes a utility function spanning several generations. Utility depends on the consumption of parents and on the quantity and quality of their children. The income of children is raised when they receive more human and nonhuman capital from their parents. Their income is also raised by their "endowment" of genetically determined race, ability, and other characteristics, family reputation and "connections," and knowledge, skills, and goals provided by their family environment. The fortunes of children are linked to their parents not only through investments but also through these endowments acquired from parents (and other family members). The equilibrium income of children is determined by their market and endowed luck, the own income and endowment of parents, and the two parameters, the degree of inheritability and the propensity to invest in children. If these parameters are both less than unity, the distribution of income between families approaches a stationary distribution. The stationary coefficient of variation is greater, the larger the degree of in-heritability and the smaller the propensity to invest in children. Intergenerational mobility measures the effect of a family on the well-being of its children. We show that the family is more important when the degree of inheritability and the propensity to invest are larger. If both these parameters are less than unity, an increase in family income in one generation has negligible effects on the incomes of much later descendants. However, the incomes of children, grandchildren, and other early descendants could significantly increase; indeed, if the sum of these parameters exceeds unity, the changes in income rise for several generations before falling, and the maximum increase in income could exceed the initial increase.

This paper brings together and integrates social interactions and the special relation between quantity and quality. We are able to show that the observed quality income elasticity would be relatively high and the quantity elasticity relatively low and sometimes negative, even if the true "unobserved� income elasticities for quantity and quality were equal and of average value. Moreover, the observed quality elasticity would fall, and the observed quantity elasticity would rise, as parental income rose.

The paper attempts to integrate new approaches to estimating union wage effects with the analysis of public-private sector wage differentials. Estimates of the union differential in both public and private sectors, allowing for the endogeneity of union status, are presented. The hypothesis that the recently measured rents to public sector employment primarily reflect the recent increase in unionization in that sector is examined, and receives considerable empirical support. There was evidence of positive selection into the union sector, especially for private sector workers. Union status appears to be strongly influenced by the expected wage gain from joining the union sector.