Policymakers continuously debate the current U.S. Housing Voucher Program, which features a high degree of rationing and decreasing subsidy amount as income increases. This paper studies the effect of the Housing Voucher Program on low-income household labor supply and welfare. Using several datasets, I estimate a dynamic lifecycle model to study the long-term impacts of housing vouchers on employment, and examine how a set of policy reforms affect household labor supply and well-being. I show that voucher usage (as opposed to no vouchers) decreases female labor supply by 17% and male labor supply by 7% in the long run. Compared to the current program, a proposed reform that provides every recipient with a flat-rate subsidy increases female labor supply by 4% and leads to higher welfare. Policies that offer a lower subsidy to a larger population decrease labor supply by 3-4% and increase household welfare. Time-limited subsidies increase female employment by 4% and improve overall welfare.

We use Danish administrative data to examine the effects of parental death on labor market outcomes. Leveraging the timing of sudden, first parental deaths and a matched-control difference-in-differences strategy, we find that men’s earnings decline by 2 percent, while women’s earnings decline by 3 percent following a parental death. Both women and men experience mental health deterioration, leading to increased use of psychological assistance and prescriptions for mental health conditions and opioids. Women with young children experience a comparatively larger earnings decline (around 4 percent) likely due to the loss of informal childcare. (JEL D91, I12, J13, J16, J31)

We examine the relation between the level of trust in a country and corporate cash holdings. The precautionary savings motive predicts that firms located in countries with less trusting societies will hoard more cash in order to compensate for reduced access to capital markets. The agency hypothesis predicts that shareholders in countries with low levels of societal trust will pressure firms to disgorge cash. The first theory predicts a negative relation between trust and corporate cash holdings while the second theory predicts a positive relation between these two variables. Using data on firms located in 54 countries around the world, we find evidence in favor of the agency-based explanation for the relation between trust and corporate cash holdings. Overall, our results highlight the role played by informal institutions in shaping corporate financial management.

In this paper we propose to measure the model risk of Expected Shortfall as the optimal correction needed to pass several ES backtests, and investigate the properties of our proposed measures of model risk from a regulatory perspective. Our results show that for the DJIA index, the smallest corrections are required for the ES estimates built using GARCH models. Furthermore, the 2.5% ES requires smaller corrections for model risk than the 1% VaR, which advocates the replacement of VaR with ES as recommended by the Basel Committee. Also, if the model risk of VaR is taken into account, then the corrections made to the ES estimates reduce by 50% on average.

This paper examines earnings management by EU firms that initiate an antidumping investigation. We first document economically and statistically significant income-decreasing earnings management around the initiation of an antidumping investigation. We show that earnings management increases when accounting data directly affect the magnitude of the tariffs imposed in the trade investigation. We also find that earnings management decreases as the number of petitioning firms increases or as the distance between petitioning firms increases, suggesting free-rider and coordination problems. We find that earnings management increases when the petition is directed at a country that imports more goods from the petitioning firm's home country, suggesting that retaliation threats affect incentives. We document that raising equity or debt financing moderates income-decreasing earnings management, consistent with the idea that sample firms trade off capital market and regulatory considerations. Our results indicate that contemporary research methods can detect accruals-based earnings management in settings in which the incentives for earnings management can be clearly identified.

Domestic abuse encompasses a range of damaging behaviors beyond physical violence, including economic and emotional abuse. We analyze the impact of cohabiting with an abusive partner on victims’ economic outcomes. In so doing, we highlight the systematic role of economic suppression in such relationships. Using Finnish administrative data and a matched-control event-study design, along with a within-individual comparison of outcomes across relationships, we document three new facts. First, women who begin relationships with (eventually) physically abusive men suffer large and significant earnings and employment falls immediately upon cohabiting with the abusive partner. Second, the decline in economic outcomes is non-monotonic in women’s pre-cohabitation outside options. Third, men who are violent against women in any capacity impose economic costs on all their female partners, even those who do not report physical violence. To rationalize these findings, we develop a new dynamic model of abusive relationships where women do not perfectly observe their partner’s type, and abusive men have an incentive to use economic suppression to sabotage women’s outside options and their ability to later exit the relationship.

We link every police report in Finland to administrative data to identify violence between colleagues and the economic consequences for victims, perpetrators, and firms. This new approach to observe when one colleague attacks another overcomes previous data constraints limiting evidence on this phenomenon to self-reported surveys that do not identify perpetrators. We document large, persistent labor market effects of between-colleague violence on victims and perpetrators. Male perpetrators experience substantially weaker consequences after attacking female colleagues. Perpetrators’ relative economic power in male-female violence partly explains this asymmetry. Turning to broader implications for firm recruitment and retention, we find that male-female violence causes a decline in the proportion of women at the firm, both because fewer new women are hired and current female employees leave. Management plays a key role in mediating the effects on the wider workforce. Only male-managed firms lose women. Female-managed firms exhibit a key difference relative to male-managed firms: male perpetrators are less likely to remain employed after attacking their female colleagues.