This paper examines the desirability of allowing a monopolist to determine the market price. The author finds that none of the regulatory mechanisms previously discussed in the "price versus quantities" literature strictly dominates unregulated, monopoly price-setting. Furthermore, despite suggestions by others, price-setting by a regulated monopolist whose profits coincide with society's net benefits is not always the most desirable means of control. Quantity-setting by such a monopolist may instead be the preferred choice. Combining both into one incentive-compatible mechanism provides the best regulatory scheme and one in which the regulator need not be informed about costs. Copyright 1990 by The Review of Economic Studies Limited.

This paper examines real wage measures that include leisure and nonlabor income in consumption decisions with respect to the advantages and disadvantages of partial versus complete welfare orderings and of utility-based versus utility-free wage indices. In addition, we argue that the usefulness of a real wage measure beyond welfare comparison has been ignored. To test the robustness of utility-based indices, these real wage measures are calculated for two different utility-function specifications, the indirect addilog system and the linear expenditure system. Further comparisons are made against index bounds that are independent of the functional form for preferences.

Efficiency wage considerations should be less important for piece-rate pay than for time wages. Therefore, if industry wage differentials reflect efficiency wage factors, then these pay differences should be less sizable and have less explanatory power for piecework than for timework. We test this proposition using wage data for male production workers employed in the Swedish metalworking industries in 1985. The data are partitioned into two groups of workers. In our preferred sub-sample of workers who received pay under both piece rates and time wages, our results are uniformly consistent with efficiency wage implications for industry wage differentials. For the subsample of workers who received pay under either piece rates or time wages, industry wage differentials are of equal importance under either pay scheme. These latter results, however, may also be influenced by unaccounted for sorting of workers and employers across methods of pay. Overall, our examination of industry wage differentials across methods of pay provides mixed support for efficiency wage theory.