Central banks have a primary goal of price stability. They pursue it using tools that include the interest they pay on reserves, the size and the composition of their balance sheet, and the dividends they distribute to the fiscal authority. We describe the economic theories that justify the central bank’s ability to control inflation and discuss their relative effectiveness in light of the historical record. We present alternative approaches as consistent with each other, as opposed to conflicting ideological camps. While interest-rate setting may often be superior, having both a monetarist pillar and fiscal support is essential, and at times pegging the exchange rate or monetizing the debt is inevitable. (JEL E31, E43, E52, E58, E62, F31, G21)

I present and solve the problem of a producer who faces costs of acquiring, absorbing, and processing information. I establish a series of theoretical results describing the producer's behaviour. First, I find the conditions under which the producer prefers to set a plan for the price he or she charges, or instead prefers to set a plan for the quantity he or she sells. Second, I show that the agent rationally chooses to be inattentive to news, only sporadically updating his or her information. I solve for the optimal length of inattentiveness and characterize its determinants. Third, I explicitly aggregate the behaviour of many such producers. I apply these results to a model of inflation. I find that the model can fit the quantitative facts on post-war inflation remarkably well, that it is a good forecaster of future inflation, and that it survives the Lucas critique by fitting also the pre-war facts on inflation moderately well.

A central bank's resource constraint bounds the dividends it can distribute by the present value of seignorage, which is a modest share of GDP. This is in spite of the mystique behind a central bank's balance sheet. Moreover, the statutes of the Federal Reserve or the ECB make it difficult for it to redistribute resources across regions. In a simple model of sovereign default, where multiple equilibria arise if debt repudiation lowers fiscal surpluses, the central bank may help to select one equilibrium. The central bank's main lever over fundamentals is to raise inflation, but otherwise the balance sheet gives it little leeway.

Abstract Should the generosity of unemployment benefits and the progressivity of income taxes depend on the presence of business cycles? This paper proposes a tractable model where there is a role for social insurance against uninsurable shocks to income and unemployment, as well as business cycles that are inefficient due to the presence of matching frictions and nominal rigidities. We derive an augmented Baily–Chetty formula showing that the optimal generosity of the social insurance system depends on a macroeconomic stabilization term. This term pushes for an increase in generosity when the level of economic activity is more responsive to social programmes in recessions than in booms. A calibration to the US economy shows that taking concerns for macroeconomic stabilization into account substantially raises the optimal unemployment insurance replacement rate but has a negligible impact on the optimal progressivity of the income tax. More generally, the role of social insurance programmes as automatic stabilizers affects their optimal design.

Most countries have automatic rules in their tax-and-transfer systems that are partly intended to stabilize economic fluctuations. This paper measures their effect on the dynamics of the business cycle. We put forward a model that merges the standard incomplete-markets model of consumption and inequality with the new Keynesian model of nominal rigidities and business cycles, and that includes most of the main potential stabilizers in the U.S. data and the theoretical channels by which they may work. We find that the conventional argument that stabilizing disposable income will stabilize aggregate demand plays a negligible role in the dynamics of the business cycle, whereas tax-and-transfer programs that affect inequality and social insurance can have a larger effect on aggregate volatility. However, as currently designed, the set of stabilizers in place in the U.S. has had little effect on the volatility of aggregate output fluctuations or on their welfare costs despite stabilizing aggregate consumption. The stabilizers have a more important role when monetary policy is constrained by the zero lower bound, and they affect welfare significantly through the provision of social insurance.

This paper examines the measurement of non-financial assets in imperfectly competitive markets and considers the effect of alternative measurements on firms' investing and operating activities. We analyze a duopoly where each firm manufactures, reports, and thereafter sells its inventory. We initially characterize the informativeness of a firm's accounting report when it is prepared using historical cost and find a firm's report does not always reveal its level of inventory. We then characterize the informativeness of a report when it is prepared using fair value and find it completely reveals a firm's inventory holding. We highlight the difficulty of implementing fair value measurements that arise because fair value is an endogenous consequence of the strategic interaction between firms.

This paper assesses the cross country `stylised facts' on empirical measures of the losses incurred during periods of banking crises. We first consider the direct resolution costs to the government and then the broader costs to the welfare of the economy – proxied by losses in GDP. We find that the cumulative output losses incurred during crisis periods are large, roughly 15–20%, on average, of annual GDP. In contrast to previous research, we also find that output losses incurred during crises in developed countries are as high, or higher, on average, than those in emerging-market economies. Moreover, output losses during crisis periods in developed countries also appear to be significantly larger – 10–15% – than in neighbouring countries that did not at the time experience severe banking problems. In emerging-market economies, by contrast, banking crises appear to be costly only when accompanied by a currency crisis. These results seem robust to allowing for macroeconomic conditions at the outset of crisis – in particular low and declining output growth – that have also contributed to future output losses during crises episodes.

Abstract Theory predicts that central-bank lending programs put ceilings on private domestic lending rates, reduce ex post financing risk, and encourage ex ante investment. This article shows that with global banks and integrated financial markets, but domestic central banks, then lending of last resort can be achieved using swap lines. Through them, a source central bank provides source-currency credit to recipient-country banks using the recipient central bank as the monitor and as the bearer of the credit risk. In theory, the swap lines should put a ceiling on deviations from covered interest parity, lower average ex post bank borrowing costs, and increase ex ante inflows from recipient-country banks into privately issued assets denominated in the source-country’s currency. Empirically, these three predictions are tested using variation in the terms of the swap line over time, variation in the central banks that have access to the swap line, variation in the days of the week in which the swap line is open, variation in the exposure of different securities to foreign investment, and variation in banks’ exposure to dollar funding risk. The evidence suggests that the international lender of last resort is very effective.

Abstract Long-dated inflation swap contracts provide widely used estimates of expected inflation. We develop methods to estimate complementary tail probabilities for persistently very high or low inflation using inflation options prices. We show that three new adjustments to conventional methods are crucial: inflation, horizon, and risk. We find that: (a) U.S. deflation risk in 2011–2014 has been overstated, (b) ECB unconventional policies lowered deflation disaster probabilities, (c) inflation expectations deanchored in 2021–2022, (d) reanchored as policy tightened, (e) but the 2021–2024 disaster left scars, and (f) U.S. expectations are less sensitive to inflation realizations than in the eurozone.