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Independence of Allocative Efficiency from Distribution in the Theory of Public Goods
When is the Pareto optimal amount of public goods independent of income distribution? Subject to some regularity conditions, the answer is when preferences of every individual i can be represented by a utility function of the form U(X_i,Y)=A(Y)X_i+B_i(Y) where X_i is i's consumption of private goods and Y is the amount of public goods.
On Commons and Tragedies
Rotten Kids, Purity, and Perfection
Bergstrom has shown that becker's “Rotten Kid theorem” holds in a world of two commodities if their utilities are transferable. The present paper identifies a further circumstance in which the theorem is valid. We show that it also holds in the absence of transferable utility if the externalities are assumed to take the form of a single pure public good.
The Commons and the Optimal Number of Firms
Richard Cornes, Charles F. Mason, Todd Sandler; The Commons and the Optimal Number of Firms*, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 101, Issue 3, 1 Au