This paper examines the relationship between the profitability of small single-market banks and the presence in the market of large banking organizations and banking organizations that operate primarily outside of the local banking market. We find that, in rural banking markets, the profitability of small single-market banks is significantly related to the presence of both large and small primarily-out-of-market banks. We also find that an increased presence of large or small primarily-out-of-market banks in rural banking markets reduces the positive effect of an increase in concentration on small single-market bank profits. This finding is consistent with theoretical predictions reported in the recent literature and has important implications for antitrust policy. In urban banking markets, we find little evidence of any relationship between the profitability of small single-market banks and the presence of large or primarily-out-of-market banks.

Retail banking markets have traditionally been viewed as locally limited. However, recent studies have found evidence that large multimarket banking organizations tend to offer uniform interest rates for retail deposit accounts throughout the area that they serve, at least within a given state. This uniform pricing phenomenon raises questions about the continued relevance of the concept of local banking markets for both research and antitrust purposes. We address this issue by employing a model designed to explain the pricing behavior of single-market banks that face competition from multimarket banks. Empirical results are found to be consistent with the many implications of the model. We find that even with multimarket banks present in the market, local market concentration influences the pricing behavior of single-market banks; however, this relationship weakens as the market share of multimarket banks grows. We also find that, on average, multimarket banks offer lower deposit interest rates than do single-market banks operating in the same market, and, in most cases, greater multimarket bank presence is associated with lower deposit interest rates offered by single-market banks.

This paper investigates depository institutions' decisions whether or not to impose surcharges (direct usage fees) on nondepositors who use their ATMs. In addition to documenting patterns of surcharging, we examine motives for surcharging, including both direct generation of fee revenue and the potential to attract deposit customers who wish to avoid incurring surcharges at an institution's ATMs. Consistent with expectations, we find that the probability of surcharging increases with both the institution's share of market ATMs and the time since surcharging was first allowed in the state, and decreases with increasing local ATM density. Further, we find evidence consistent with the use of surcharges to attract deposit customers who are new to the local banking market, but we find no evidence that larger banks use surcharges as a means to attract existing customers away from smaller local competitors.