We consider how the introduction of centralized netting in financial networks affects total netted exposures between counterparties. In some cases there is a trade-off: centralized netting increases the expectation of net exposures, but reduces the variance. We show that the set of networks for which expected net exposures decreases is a strict subset of those for which the variance decreases, so the trade-off can only be in one direction. For some network structures, introducing centralized netting is never beneficial to dealers unless sufficient weight is placed on reductions in variance. This may explain why, in the absence of regulation, traders in a derivatives network do not develop central clearing. Our results can be used to estimate margin requirements and counterparty risk in financial networks. We also provide techniques to evaluate the robustness of our results to behavioral responses to the introduction of centralized netting.

Privacy is a feature inherent to the use of cash. With steadily increasing market shares of digital payment platforms, privacy in payments may no longer be attainable in the future. We explore the potential welfare impacts of reductions in privacy in payments. In our framework, firms may use data collected through payments to price discriminate future consumers. A public good aspect arises because individuals do not internalize the full cost of failing to protect their privacy and reduce social welfare by suboptimally choosing not to protect their privacy in payments. We discuss potential remedies, including the issuance of electronic cash.

This paper develops the concept of a “crypto multiplier,” which measures the equilibrium response of a cryptocurrency’s market capitalization to aggregate inflows and outflows of investors’ funds. The crypto multiplier takes high values when a large share of a cryptocurrency’s coins is held as an investment rather than being used as a means of payment. Blockchain data show that the share of coins held for the purpose of making payments is rather small for major cryptocurrencies suggesting large crypto multipliers. Our results highlight the need for market participants to be vigilant when accepting block holdings of a cryptocurrency as collateral or as compensation for seed funding. The crypto multiplier indicates that the liquidation value of block holdings of cryptocurrencies can be substantially below their prevailing market values.

Stem cell transplants save lives of many patients with blood diseases. Donation is painful, but rarely has lasting adverse effects. Patients can accept transplants only from donors with compatible immune systems. Those lacking a sibling match must seek donations from the general population. The probability that two unrelated persons are compatible is less than 1/10,000. Health authorities maintain a registry of several million genetically tested potential donors who agree to donate if asked. We find that the benefits of adding registrants of every race exceed costs. We also explore the peculiar structure of voluntary public good provision that faces potential donors.

Decentralised finance (DeFi) lending protocols have experienced significant growth recently, yet the motivations driving investors remain largely unexplored. We use granular, transaction-level data from Aave, a leading player in the DeFi lending market, to study these motivations. Our theoretical and empirical findings reveal that the search for yield predominantly drives liquidity provision in DeFi lending pools, whereas borrowing activity is mainly influenced by speculative and, to some extent, governance motives. Both retail and large investors seek potential high returns through market movements and price speculation, however the latter engage in DeFi borrowing relatively more than the former also to influence protocol decisions and accrue more significant governance rights.

Systemic risk among the network of international banking groups arises when financial stress threatens to crisscross many national boundaries and expose imperfect international coordination. To assess this risk, we consider three decades of data on the cross-border interbank market. We use Rosvall and Bergstrom’s (2008) information theoretic map equation to partition banking groups from 21 countries into modules that reveal the contagious capacity of the network. We show that in the late 1980s four important financial centers formed one large super cluster that was highly contagious in terms of transmission of stress within its ranks, but less contagious on a global scale. But the expansion leading to the 2008 crisis left more transmitting hubs sharing the same total influence as a few large modules had previously. We show that this greater entanglement meant the network was more broadly contagious, and not that risk was more shared. Thus, our analysis contributes to our understanding as to why defaults in US sub-prime mortgages spread quickly through the global financial system.

Capturing financial network linkages and contagion in stress test models are important goals for banking supervisors and central banks responsible for micro- and macroprudential policy. However, granular data on financial networks is often lacking, and instead the networks must be reconstructed from partial data. In this paper, we conduct a horse race of network reconstruction methods using network data obtained from 25 different markets spanning 13 jurisdictions. Our contribution is two-fold: first, we collate and analyze data on a wide range of financial networks. And second, we rank the methods in terms of their ability to reconstruct the structures of links and exposures in networks.