Ranked earnings surprise portfolios formed from First Call files for 1992–97 are used to assess the annual earnings surprise magnitude for an individual firm sufficient to expect a “significant market reaction.” We find that, for an individual firm, the maximum probability of a gain from trading on prior knowledge of any surprise magnitude is .622. The lack of probable trading gains is due to the S–shaped surprise/return relation and the large variance of returns for a given magnitude of surprise. In turn, we find that the S–shape is related empirically to the dispersion of analyst forecasts. Thus, factors underlying dispersion differences are related to the importance or “materiality” of earnings surprise as measured by stock returns and explain at least part of the S–shaped surprise/return relation.

Audit committees evaluate financial reporting quality as part of their corporate oversight responsibilities. Given this responsibility, the national stock exchanges now require all audit committee members to be financially literate and at least one member to have financial expertise. In light of recent debates over this requirement, we provide evidence on how experts and literates differ in their evaluations of financial reporting quality. Results suggest that experts' evaluations of financial reporting quality are more strongly associated with their assessments of characteristics underlying reporting quality (e.g., relevance) espoused in Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No. 2's framework than literates' evaluations. Additionally, literates are more likely than experts to identify concerns about reporting treatments for business activities that are prominent in the business press or are distinguished by their nonrecurring nature, while experts are more likely to raise concerns about reporting treatments for less prominent, recurring activities. This same pattern occurs in the ratings of the quality of the reporting treatments for specific financial statement items with respect to elements underlying reporting quality (e.g., neutrality); literates (experts) assess the quality elements for the reporting treatments of prominent and nonrecurring items (less prominent and recurring items) comparatively lower than experts (literates). These results suggest that including financial experts on audit committees is likely to change the structure and focus of audit committee discussions about financial reporting quality, and may affect the committee's overall assessment of the quality of a company's financial reports.

Abstract In this study we conduct an experiment to examine how qualifying an income‐decreasing accounting change in years of strong financial performance affects financial report users' assessments of strategic reporting, current financial performance, and future financial performance (performance over the next three years). We find that without the qualification, users viewed the income‐decreasing accounting change as relatively nonstrategic and that user assessments of current and future performance were not different. In the presence of the qualification, users believed that the accounting change was relatively strategic, and they discounted the income effect of the accounting change. We find further that their assessments of future performance were below their assessments of current performance but no different from the assessments of future performance in the absence of the qualification. Although our findings suggest that audit qualifications encourage users to be skeptical of income‐decreasing accounting changes, we find no evidence that they impose negative consequences on management in terms of lower assessments of financial performance.

In this paper we study the least squares (LS) estimator in a linear panel regression model with unknown number of factors appearing as interactive fixed effects. Assuming that the number of factors used in estimation is larger than the true number of factors in the data, we establish the limiting distribution of the LS estimator for the regression coefficients as the number of time periods and the number of cross-sectional units jointly go to infinity. The main result of the paper is that under certain assumptions the limiting distribution of the LS estimator is independent of the number of factors used in the estimation, as long as this number is not underestimated. The important practical implication of this result is that for inference on the regression coefficients one does not necessarily need to estimate the number of interactive fixed effects consistently.

ABSTRACT During a look-back analysis, auditors review prior-period evidence to understand estimation inaccuracies and assess the reliability of management's estimation process. We find that evidence specificity moderates the relation between the consistency of an estimation inaccuracy with management's incentives and auditors' reliability assessments. The direction of an estimation inaccuracy has no effect on auditors' reliability assessments when the prior-period evidence is less specific. When prior-period evidence is more specific, auditors report the highest (lowest) reliability assessments of management's estimation process when an estimation inaccuracy is inconsistent (consistent) with management's incentives. Auditors' low reliability assessments in the more specific, consistent condition, however, do not translate to high risk assessments. Instead, specificity has a main effect on auditors' risk assessments. A follow-up experiment reveals, though, an inverse relation between auditors' reliability and risk assessments when auditors are provided procedures to address various levels of assessed misstatement risk.