We identify the location of an executive's undergraduate university education as a proxy for their geographic preference. Executives whose university education took place near a firm's headquarters are paid 4.40% to 11.01% less than their peers, suggesting the transparency of university education allows firms to use the location of their headquarters as a form of intangible compensation. This geographic preference discount persists across all levels of the C-Suite, corporate governance quality, time periods, and after controlling for opaque measures of where the executive grew up. Our study shows the location of an executive's undergraduate university is a consequential component of his or her geographic preference, and that such preference has meaningful implications for his or her compensation.

Abstract Firms falling short of earnings expectations are more likely to cite stakeholder-focused objectives in their public communications following earnings announcements. This behavior is consistent with managers preferring to be evaluated by subjective stakeholder-based performance criteria when falling short on objective shareholder-based measures. This increased use of stakeholder language is most evident among firms narrowly missing earnings estimates and appears unrelated to a firm’s actual environmental, social, and governance (ESG)-related activity. Stakeholder language appears to influence the evaluation of CEOs; turnover–performance sensitivity is lower for managers citing stakeholder value. Collectively, our findings are consistent with concerns that stakeholder objectives reduce managerial accountability for poor performance.

Abstract We provide evidence of a network of information flow between activists and other investors prior to 13D filings. We match EDGAR search activity to investor IP addresses, identifying specific investors who persistently download information on an individual activist’s campaign targets in the days prior to that activist’s 13D disclosures. This outside investor’s knowledge of pending activist campaign plans seems to benefit both parties: the informed investor, unnamed in the 13D, increases its holdings in the targeted stock prior to the price surge upon 13D disclosure, while the activist earns voting support that increases their likelihood of pursuing and winning a proxy fight.