Journal Article Corporate Taxation and Dividend Behaviour: a Reply and Extension Get access Martin S. Feldstein Martin S. Feldstein Harvard University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Review of Economic Studies, Volume 39, Issue 2, April 1972, Pages 235–240, https://doi.org/10.2307/2296876 Published: 01 April 1972

Journal Article Wage Bargains, Threshold Effects, and the Phillips Curve: A Reply Get access Daniel S. Hamermesh Daniel S. Hamermesh Princeton University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 86, Issue 2, May 1972, Pages 339–341, https://doi.org/10.2307/1880570 Published: 01 May 1972

I. Introduction, 175. — II. The optimal price, 176. — III. The welfare loss due to incorrect pricing, 182. — IV. An example, 183. — V. Concluding remarks, 187.

Wallace and Hussain (1969) considered the use of an error components regression model in the analysis of time series of cross-sections and developed an estimator of the coefficient vector based on an estimated variance-covariance matrix of error terms. In this paper, we have shown that under the set of assumptions adopted by Wallace and Hussain there are an infinite number of estimators which have the same asymptotic variancecovariance matrix as the Wallace-Hussain estimator and also that it is not possible to choose an estimator on the basis of asymptotic efficiency. We have developed an alternative estimator of the variance-covariance matrix of error terms and have used this estimator in developing a feasible Aitken type estimator for the coefficient vector. We have derived some small sample properties of this estimator and have compared them with those of other estimators of the coefficient vector.

[This paper deals with two single-equation estimators in a set of simultaneous linear stochastic equations--namely, ordinary least squares (OLS) and two-stage least squares (2SLS). Under the assumption that all predetermined variables in the model are exogenous, necessary and sufficient conditions are obtained for the existence of even moments of the above estimators. It is shown that for the general case with an arbitrary number of included endogenous variables, even moments of the 2SLS estimator are finite if and only if the order is less than K2 - G1 + 1. Furthermore, even moments of the OLS estimator exist if and only if the order is less than N - K1 - G1 + 1, where N is the sample size, G1 + 1 is the number of included endogenous variables, K1 and K2 respectively are the number of included and excluded exogenous variables in the equation to be estimated.]

[This survey of the use of structural equation models and methods by social scientists emphasizes the treatment of unobservable variables and attempts to redress economists' neglect of the work of Sewall Wright.]

1. TO BE CLEAR from the beginning, this note does not provide practical aids to identification; the information is very unlikely to be available. Rather, this paper serves an expository purpose, that of seeking to clarify two ideas: first, multiple-identification, by presenting and analyzing an example within a linear system, and second, Working's and Fisher's ideas on relative variances as identification aids, by showing the consequences of knowing that one variance is a specific large multiple of another. Along the way we provide a correction to the econometrics literature.

The three primary conclusions of my previous study can be summarized briefly. First, there appears to be a permanent excess demand for physicians' services. The observed prices and quantities are not points on the demand function and the market does not follow a Marshallian or Walrasian process of adjustment to remove the excess demand. Second, physicians' fees rise when patients' ability to pay improves through higher income or more complete insurance coverage. More than a third of the potential gain from improved insurance coverage has been dissipated by induced price increases. Third, the supply equation indicates that physicians reduce the quantity of services provided when fees rise. This in turn implies that government action to control physicians' fees may increase the quantity of services provided. Professors Brown and Lapan raise some questions about the research and about the first and third of these conclusions. However, a careful analysis of their note shows that the original conclusions can remain unchanged. Their own discussion, on the other hand, contains a number of serious errors.

W E shall not know for many months if AVIV~the introduction of direct controls over wages and prices in late 1971 was followed by a significant slowdown in the trend of price and wage increases. Even if inflation will moderate somewhat, as is likely, economists will still be debating for years whether this can be attributed to the controls or whether it is simply the delayed result of considerable slack in the economy. But whatever the outcome of this future academic debate, some form of direct control is likely to be with us for some time. The establishment of direct controls on August 15, 1971 was popular among the public at large and subsequent opinion polls indicate that this program, despite its uncertain performance to date, has not become a political liability. The controls are only likely to be abandoned if they seriously hurt some important pressure group without visible offsetting benefits elsewhere, but this has not happened so far. Although some discontent among West Coast longshoremen gave most of the labor representatives on the Pay Board a pretext for walking out, most union members, and even the departed leaders themselves, are apparently quite willing to live with continued controls. The Price Commission has so far managed to avoid widespread criticism, except on the issue of food prices over which the Commission has only limited jurisdiction. Aside from public reaction, another reason for thinking that controls will not disappear soon is that inflationary pressures are likely to become more intense as the economy comes closer to capacity operation. If there is a case for controls when unemployment is around 6 per cent, it will be even stronger if unemployment drops to a more sustainable level. Unlike the control programs imposed in wartime, the present program has no natural termination point. The view that the present controls will be effective mainly by bringing about a reversal in inflationary psychology is not likely to be substantiated unless inflation can be curtailed much more drastically than official pronouncements suggest. A reduction in the inflation rate from 4 per cent to 3 per cent, while welcome, will scarcely allay widespread apprehension about large budget deficits and rapid monetary expansion. In fact, the belief that sheer psychology, as opposed to expectations based on experience, plays an important role in the inflationary process does not appear to be supported by any evidence. Unless real output can be made to grow at a much higher rate than has so far been achieved, the rapid growth in the money supply combined with the usual lags virtually guarantees the preservation of inflationary pressures well into 1973, if not longer.1 A recent Brookings study (Schultze et al. 1972, especially chapter 13) suggests that the Federal budget will not be a restraining influence either. If this prognosis for controls is correct, the question is what they will actually achieve. Even if attained, the modest reduction in the inflation rate officially set as a goal provides only weak justification for this drastic departure from our generally successful economic traditions. There is some indication that the Pay Board and Price Commission will serve less as a means of curtailing inflation than as watchdogs over big business and big labor. The three-tier classification of business firms by the Price Commission is one indication in this direction, and it has been further reinforced by the recent exemption of most small enterprices from price and wage controls. The Pay Board and the Construction Industry Stabilization Committee already spend most, if not all, of their time on organized labor. There is indeed a case for better supervision of the labor unions. In the last few years we