This article presents evidence about the effects of dismissals‐for‐cause requirements, a specific component of employment protection legislation that has received little attention. I study a quasi‐experiment generated by a law introduced in Portugal: out of the 12 paragraphs in the law that dictated the costly procedure required for dismissals for cause, eight did not apply to small firms. Using matched employer‐employee longitudinal data and difference‐in‐differences methods, I examine the impact of that differentiated change in firing costs upon several variables. The results do not indicate robust effects on job or worker flows, although some estimates suggest an increase in hirings. However, firms that gain flexibility in their dismissals exhibit sizable increases in their relative performance. This finding suggests that reducing firing costs of the type studied here increases workers’ effort.

Abstract We show that acquirer returns are significantly higher in stock-swap acquisitions of difficult-to-value targets, as measured by R&D intensity and idiosyncratic return volatility. This finding contributes to an explanation of the determinants of, and value gains from, using stock as a method of payment. The effects of target-valuation uncertainty on both the method of payment and the market reaction to acquisitions are more likely to be apparent in samples of private acquisitions, as these effects can be masked in samples of acquisitions of publicly held targets. Nevertheless, our results hold for publicly traded targets in multivariate analysis.

[Existing research shows that significantly more acquisitions occur when stock markets are booming than when markets are depressed. Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004) hypothesize that firm-specific and market-wide (mis-)valuations lead to an excess of mergers, and these will be value destroying. This article investigates whether acquisitions occurring during booming markets are fundamentally different from those occurring during depressed markets. We find that acquirers buying during high-valuation markets have significantly higher announcement returns but lower long-run abnormal stock and operating performance than those buying during low-valuation markets. We investigate possible explanations for the long-run underperformance and conclude it is consistent with managerial herding.]

We examine the information transmission role of stock recommendation revisions by sell-side security analysts. Revisions are associated with economically insignificant mean price reactions and often piggyback on recent news, events, long-term momentum, and short-run contrarian return predictors, typically downgrading after bad news and upgrading after good news. However, the revisions are usually information-free for investors. The findings go against the long-standing view that recommendations are an important means by which analysts assimilate information into stock prices. They disagree with the view of policymakers that analysts’ stock picks materially impact stock prices.

ABSTRACT We examine management discretion to decide when and how much to write down an asset, in a unique case where a tracking stock provides an observable market value for the asset. We find that, despite market evidence that Inco Ltd.'s financial statements substantially overvalued the Voisey's Bay nickel mine throughout 1997 to 2000, management chose not to write down the mine until 2002. Inco management used an independent fairness opinion to justify its December 2000 redemption of the tracking stock at 25% of its initial value, indicating almost surely that Inco management was aware of the generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) impairment. This case illustrates that GAAP's reliance on undiscounted cash flows for impairment decisions allows huge unrecorded disparities between book and market value. The management discretion exercised in this case provides a concrete example of the subjectivity inherent in fair valuation.

[We study the effect of introducing a nonredundant derivative on the volatilities of the stock market return and the locally risk-free interest rate. Our analysis uses a standard, frictionless, full-information, dynamic, continuous-time, general-equilibrium, Lucas endowment economy in which there are two classes of agents who have time-additive power utility functions and differ only in their risk aversion. Our main result is to show analytically that if the intensity of the precautionary demand for savings is not too high, then the introduction of a nonredundant derivative increases the volatility of stock market returns. Furthermore, in the economy with the derivative, the volatility of stock market returns can be substantially greater than that of aggregate dividend growth (fundamental volatility). We also show that the volatility of the locally risk-free interest rate increases with the introduction of the derivative.]

Most affine models of the term structure with stochastic volatility predict that the variance of the short rate should play a ‘dual role’ in that it should also equal a linear combination of yields. However, we find that estimation of a standard affine three-factor model results in a variance state variable that, while instrumental in explaining the shape of the yield curve, is essentially unrelated to GARCH estimates of the quadratic variation of the spot rate process or to implied variances from options. We then investigate four-factor affine models. Of the models tested, only the model that exhibits ‘unspanned stochastic volatility’ (USV) generates both realistic short rate volatility estimates and a good cross-sectional fit. Our findings suggest that short rate volatility cannot be extracted from the cross-section of bond prices. In particular, short rate volatility and convexity are only weakly correlated.

Existing research shows that significantly more acquisitions occur when stock markets are booming than when markets are depressed. Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004) hypothesize that firm-specific and market-wide valuations lead to an excess of mergers, and these will be value destroying. This article investigates whether acquisitions occurring during booming markets are fundamentally different from those occurring during depressed markets. We find that acquirers buying during high-valuation markets have significantly higher announcement returns but lower long-run abnormal stock and operating performance than those buying during low-valuation markets. We investigate possible explanations for the long-run underperformance and conclude it is consistent with managerial herding. The Author 2007. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: [email protected]., Oxford University Press.

Prior evidence that higher-quality financial reporting improves capital investment efficiency leaves unaddressed whether it reduces over- or under-investment. This study provides evidence of both in documenting a conditional negative (positive) association between financial reporting quality and investment for firms operating in settings more prone to over-investment (under-investment). Firms with higher financial reporting quality also are found to deviate less from predicted investment levels and show less sensitivity to macro-economic conditions. These results suggest that one mechanism linking reporting quality and investment efficiency is a reduction of frictions such as moral hazard and adverse selection that hamper efficient investment.

[Commodity derivatives are becoming an increasingly important part of the global derivatives market. Here we develop a tractable stochastic volatility model for pricing commodity derivatives. The model features unspanned stochastic volatility, quasi-analytical prices of options on futures contracts, and dynamics of the futures curve in terms of a low-dimensional affine state vector. We estimate the model on NYMEX crude oil derivatives using an extensive panel data set of 45,517 futures prices and 233,104 option prices, spanning 4082 business days. We find strong evidence for two predominantly unspanned volatility factors.]