ABSTRACT We hypothesize that one way accounting practices spread is through law firm connections. We investigate this prediction by examining companies that avoided reporting compensation expense by engaging in stock option backdating. We hypothesize that executives engaged in backdating because they were desensitized to its inappropriateness when they learned through their legal counsel that other companies were engaging in this practice. We identify backdating companies through backdating-related restatements of earnings. Using network analysis, we find that backdating companies are highly connected with other backdating companies via shared law firms. Logistic regressions reveal that the odds of a company backdating are 53 to 88 percent higher when its law firm has another client that backdates, and that law firm connections are incremental to board interlocks and geographic location. Finally, law firms with backdating clients have more other clients with “lucky” grants, suggesting that backdating spread to other companies, but only some restated. JEL Classifications: J33; K22; K42; L14; M41; M43; M45.

Abstract We document that firms vary in their timeliness of support for the Black Lives Matter (BLM) movement following the death of George Floyd in May 2020, and that timeliness is an indicator of authenticity. We predict that firms that speak out quickly in support of BLM (via Twitter or their websites) have made more investments in diversity and inclusion, relative to firms that speak out slowly (via conference calls or annual reports) or that remain silent. Consistent with this prediction, quick -disclosing firms have greater workforce diversity, have boards with greater ethnic diversity, and are more likely to tie executive compensation to diversity and inclusivity. Furthermore, quick -disclosing firms increase their hiring of both Black American employees and Black directors relative to firms that stay silent. We also document that quick-disclosing firms are part of more supportive stakeholder networks. We develop an inclusivity index and show that firms with higher index levels are more likely to speak out on the Capitol Riots, the Asian Spa Shootings, and voting rights.

Against the backdrop of an increasing threat of misinformation on social media, several countries have enacted regulations to curb the spread of misinformation. This study examines how corporate social media strategy responds to misinformation regulations. Using a large cross-country dataset of corporate tweets and a stacked regression analysis, we show that misinformation regulations lead to less corporate social media disclosure. This result suggests that, by deterring misinformation, these regulations reduce firms’ need to use social media to counteract its adverse effects. Additional analyses show that the effect strengthens among countries with higher social media usage and those with stronger investor protection but weakens for firms with stronger information environments. Finally, we provide direct evidence that firms post fewer tweets refuting misinformation about themselves following the enactment of these regulations.