Abstract The early stage of the 2007/2008 financial crisis was marked by large value losses for bank stocks. This article identifies the equity funds most affected by this valuation shock and examines its consequences for the nonfinancial stocks owned by the respective funds. We document three key empirical findings. First, ownership links to these distressed equity funds lead to large temporary underperformance of the most exposed nonfinancial stocks. Second, distressed equity funds make the better performing stocks in their portfolio the preferred liquidation choice. Third, stocks with higher overall fund ownership generally performed better throughout the crisis.

This paper provides evidence for a causal effect of equity prices on corporate investment and employment. We use fire sales by distressed equity funds during the 2007–2009 financial crisis to identify substantial exogenous underpricing. Firms whose stocks are most underpriced have considerably lower investment and employment than industry peers not subject to any fire sale discount. The causal effect of underpricing on investment is found to be largely concentrated on the most financially constrained firms.

The eurozone has a single short-term nominal interest rate, but monetary policy conditions measured by real short-term interest rates varied substantially across countries in the period 2003–2010. We use this cross-country variation in the (local) tightness of monetary policy to examine its influence on equity and money market flows. In line with a powerful risk-shifting channel, we find that fund investors in countries with decreased real interest rates shift their portfolio investment out of the money market and into the riskier equity market, causing significant equity price inflation in countries where investment home bias is the strongest.

Abstract We find that local analyst recommendations are systematically more optimistic than foreign analyst recommendations in emerging markets. The effects of this novel “home bias” among local analysts overwhelm any information asymmetry between foreign and local analysts. Consequently, local analyst upgrades underperform foreign analyst upgrades, while local analyst downgrades outperform foreign analyst downgrades. Neither foreign investors, local institutions, nor retail investors appear to be fully cognizant of this bias. Trade reactions suggest that foreign investors overestimate the bias in foreign analyst recommendations while local institutions underestimate the bias in local analyst recommendations. These results are pervasive across countries, time periods, and stock groupings, and can be traced to investment banking pressure.

The purpose of this paper is to provide a comprehensive analysis of corporate valuation around the world. Specifically, we (i) document and compare corporate valuation around the world, and (ii) identify the key factors that drive cross-country differences in valuation. In doing so, we utilize the country-level Tobin’s q (CTQ), computed as the ratio of the aggregate market value to book value of all assets held by all public firms domiciled in a country, which amounts to the Tobin’s q for the ‘market portfolio’ of the country. The key findings of the paper are: First, CTQ varies greatly across countries, ranging from 0.73 for Venezuela to 2.11 for Finland, with the international mean of 1.30 during our sample period 1999–2004. Despite the steady integration of the world economy in recent years, corporate valuation remains starkly different across countries. Second, apart from the effect of corporate governance, cross-country differences in corporate valuation are significantly driven by the growth options of countries represented by the R&D intensities, capital expenditures, and GDP growth. In addition, the degree of capital market openness has a significant, independent effect on valuation. Third, our regression analyses show that CTQ varies directly with shareholder rights, enforcement of insider trading laws, GDP growth, R&D intensity, and the degree of capital market openness. The key findings remain robust to the inclusion of inflation and industry effects.

Abstract To the extent that investors diversify internationally, large-cap stocks receive the dominant share of fund allocation. Increasingly, however, returns to large-cap stocks or stock market indices tend to comove, mitigating the benefits from international diversification. In contrast, stocks of locally oriented, small companies do not exhibit the same tendency. In this paper, we assess the potential of small-cap stocks as a vehicle for international portfolio diversification during the period 1980–1999. We show that the extra gains from the augmented diversification with small-cap funds are statistically significant for both in-sample and out-of-sample periods and remain robust to the consideration of market frictions.

We propose a new methodology to provide fair prices of international mutual funds by adjusting prices at the individual security level using a comprehensive and economically relevant information set. Stepwise regressions are used to endogenously determine the stock-specific optimal set of factors. Using 16 synthetic funds whose characteristics are extracted from 16 corresponding actual US-based Japanese mutual funds, we demonstrate that our method estimates fund prices significantly more accurately than existing methods. Although existing fair-pricing methods provide an improvement over the current practice of simply using Japanese market closing prices, they are still highly vulnerable to exploitation by market-timers. By contrast, our method is the most successful in preventing such strategic exploitation since no competing method can profit from our stated prices.

This study examines the empirical controversy over the pricing effect of the Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O׳Hara (2002) probability of information-based trading, PIN, on a sample of 30,095 firms from 47 countries worldwide. Contrary to the empirical evidence of Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O׳Hara, but consistent with that of Duarte and Young (2009), we do not find that PIN exhibits a positive effect on a cross section of expected stock returns in international markets. Alternative information-based trading measures also display no effect on expected stock returns, corroborating our finding that information risk proxied by PIN, in general, has no pricing effect in world markets.