UK companies have been making large contributions to reduce the deficits of their pension funds, and are believed to fund such contributions in part by reducing dividends. Using data from 2003 to 16, we find little evidence that large deficit-reduction contributions are associated with reductions in regular dividends, though we find some restraint in dividend increases and total payout. Most companies make large contributions when they have healthy cash flows and strong profitability, or inflows from disposals of assets. This suggests that the Pensions Regulator allows companies flexibility regarding the timing of contributions.

Abstract Exploiting changes in countries’ competition laws, we find that competition increases firms’ propensity to use zero leverage (ZL). We test the financial-flexibility, financial-constraint, and quiet-life explanations for this result, concluding that desire for flexibility is the one most likely. The relation between competition and ZL strengthens with cash-flow volatility, which supports the flexibility motive. Adoption of ZL by firms is accompanied by increases in payouts, so it is unlikely that ZL adopters are constrained. Proxies for governance have no effect on the relation between competition and ZL, suggesting that desire for a quiet life is not the explanation either.

Evidence in financial markets of an opportunity for pure arbitrage, and therefore a violation of the law of one price, is considered an anomaly to be noted. This paper reports an apparent violation of the law of one price between UK government gilts and their separately traded principal and coupon strips over a sample period of nearly 14years. There are persistent price differences, and hence opportunities for arbitrage, after allowance for the bid-ask spread; the strips package tends to be overpriced in relation to the corresponding gilt. The price differences may, in part, be due to a lack of liquidity and stale prices in the strips market.

Nearly 30% of US banks employ at least one board member who currently serves (or has previously served) the Federal Reserve in a public service role. Public service roles take the form of Federal Reserve directorships or memberships in Federal Reserve advisory councils. We show that connections between banks and the Federal Reserve are linked to decreases in the sensitivity of bank leverage to risk. Further, connected banks extract larger public subsidies by shifting risk to the financial safety-net. Jointly, our results suggest that interactions between banks and regulators reduce supervisory effectiveness.

Widespread bank losses during the financial crisis have raised concerns that equity-based compensation for bank CEOs causes excessive risk-taking. Debt-based compensation, so-called inside debt, aligns the interests of CEOs with those of external creditors. We examine whether inside debt induces CEOs to pursue less risky acquisitions. Consistent with this, we show that acquisitions announced by CEOs with high inside debt incentives are associated with a wealth transfer from equity to debt holders. After the completion of a deal, banks where acquiring CEOs have high inside debt incentives display lower market measures of risk and lower loss exposures for taxpayers.

Bank payouts divert cash to shareholders, while leaving behind riskier and less liquid assets to repay debt holders in the future. Bank payouts, therefore, constitute a type of risk-shifting that benefits equity holders at the expense of debt holders. In this paper, we provide insights on how CEO incentives stemming from inside debt (primarily defined benefit pensions and deferred compensation) impact bank payout policy in a manner that protects debt holder interests. We show that CEOs with higher inside debt relative to inside equity are associated with more conservative bank payout policies. Specifically, CEOs paid with more inside debt are more likely to cut payouts and to cut payouts by a larger amount. Reductions in payouts occur through a decrease in both dividends and repurchases. Our results also hold over a subsample of TARP banks where we expect the link between risk-shifting and payouts to be of particular relevance because it involves wealth transfers from the taxpayer to equity holders. We conclude that inside debt can help in addressing risk-shifting concerns by aligning the interests of CEOs with those of creditors, regulators, and in the case of TARP banks, the taxpayer.