This study examines the relevance of bank board structure on bank risk-taking. Using a sample of 212 large US bank holding companies over 1997–2004 (1534 observations), this study finds that strong bank boards (boards reflecting more of bank shareholders interest) particularly small and less restrictive boards positively affect bank risk-taking. In contrast, CEO power (CEO’s ability to control board decision) negatively affects bank risk-taking. These results are consistent with the bank contracting environment and robust to several proxies for bank risk-takings and different estimation techniques.

We study whether board structure (board size, independence and gender diversity) in banks relates to performance. Using a broad panel of large US bank holding companies over the period 1997–2011, we find that both board size and independent directors decrease bank performance. Although gender diversity improves bank performance in the pre-Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) period (1997–2002), the positive effect of gender diminishes in both the post-SOX (2003–2006) and the crisis periods (2007–2011). Finally, we show that board structure is particularly relevant for banks with low market power, if they are immune to the threat of external takeover and/or they are small. Our two-step system generalised method of moments estimation accounts for endogeneity concerns (simultaneity, reverse causality and unobserved heterogeneity). The findings are robust to a wide range of other sensitivity checks including alternative proxies for bank performance.

This paper examines the trends and endogenous determinants of boards of directors (board size, composition, and CEO duality) for a sample of 212 US bank holding companies, from 1997 to 2004. Overall, the results show that the costs and benefits of boards’ monitoring and advising roles could explain bank board structures with caveats. For example, due to the regulatory nature and comparatively intensive scrutiny of bank officers and directors, it is argued that bank managers have less control over the directors’ selection processes. Thus, bank board independence should not be the outcome of negotiation with CEOs. Consistent with this view, bank CEOs are found not to affect bank board independence. The trend analysis also provides some important results. In contrast to non-bank evidence, for instance, board size was discovered to decrease over the sample period for large and medium-sized banks, while board size remained relatively stable for small banks. These results are robust with respect to different estimation specifications. Furthermore, the study’s findings have important policy implications for bank regulators and investors.

We find that a CEO's industry tournament incentives (CITI) induce a CEO to undertake strategies that reduce the propensity of a firm to incur future stock price crash risk. CITI also has a mitigating effect on accounting techniques (such as, accrual manipulation, real earnings management, and financial restatement) used as channels for obfuscation and, therefore, is associated with a lower tendency to withhold bad news. CITI is more effective in reducing crash risk propensity when there is lower information quality and weaker external monitoring. Results are robust to firm governance controls, gender monitoring, and the specific personal attributes of CEOs. In short, CITI imposes on CEOs an incentive to brand themselves according to sustained visibility concepts.

We test the effect of short-term versus long-term institutional shareholding –so-called investor horizon– on bank risk-taking. We find that in contrast to banks dominated by short-term shareholders, banks with greater long-term shareholding are associated with lower risk, better stock performance, and conservative business and compensation policies. Our results imply that bank regulators should be more vigilant over the actions of banks that heavily rely on short-term shareholding.

We argue a positive association between common ownership and liquidity creation because common ownership increases risk-absorption capacity through higher profit margins, greater equity capital, and improved disclosure quality. Accordingly, we find solid evidence that banks with greater common ownership create 3.56%–4.54% more liquidity. The beneficial effect on liquidity creation is dominant for banks with high risk-absorption capacities, enhanced disclosure quality, low competition, greater long-term shareholdings, and low performance-sensitive managerial incentives, substantiating our theoretical conjectures and establishing five significant channels. Finally, we show that banks have incentive to create more liquidity when they have significant co-ownerships among themselves. Our main findings remain robust to multiple proxies, alternative specifications, and three methods to address endogeneity concerns – difference-in-differences based on the Blackrock–Barclays Global Investors merger in 2009, two-stage least squares analysis with instrumental variables based on Russell 2000 index inclusion, and propensity score matching.