Following the crisis, macroprudential regulations targeting mortgage-market vulnerabilities were widely adopted, their success often relying on the response of financial intermediaries. We provide evidence from Canada suggesting banks may have behaved strategically to limit the effectiveness of recently implemented mortgage stress tests. Before implementation, borrowers had to prove they could make mortgage payments based on the interest rate specified in the contract. The new tests require borrowers to show they can afford payments based on a typically higher qualifying rate, derived from the mode of 5-year rates posted by the six largest banks. The government’s objective was to cool credit markets, but, since many mortgages are government-insured, the big banks’ interests were not aligned. We find evidence of rate manipulation using a difference-in-differences approach comparing changes in spreads for 5-year mortgages with 3-year spreads, unaffected by the policy. The qualifying rates were lowered encouraging continued borrowing, muting the tests’ impact.

ABSTRACT Using contract‐level data for the Canadian mortgage market, this paper provides evidence of an “invest‐and‐harvest” pricing pattern. We build a dynamic model of price negotiation with search and switching frictions to capture key market features. We estimate the model and use it to investigate the effects of market frictions and the resulting dynamic competition on borrowers' and banks' payoffs. We show that dynamic pricing and the presence of search and switching costs have important implications for public policies.

We study the role of brokers in selection markets. We find broker-clients in the Canadian mortgage market are observationally different from branch-clients. They finance larger loans with more leverage and longer amortization. We build and estimate a model of mortgage demand to disentangle three possible explanations for these riskier product choices: (1) selection on observables, (2) unobserved borrower preferences for riskier loans, and (3) a causal effect of brokers. Although we find that brokers influence product choices, the main reason borrowers choose high-leverage products is unobserved preferences. Borrowers prefer larger loans and brokers facilitate qualification for them.