I argue that the winners and losers from trade are decided primarily by occupation. In addition to fixed adjustment costs, workers build up specific human capital over time that is destroyed when they must change occupations. I show that ignoring human capital biases estimates of adjustment costs upward by a factor of 3. Estimating an occupational choice model of the Danish labor market, I show that 57 percent of the dispersion in worker outcomes is accounted for by occupations, and only 16 percent by sectors. Finally, the model suggests that rising import competition from 1995–2005 reduced lifetime earnings for 5 percent of workers. (JEL F14, F16, J24, J31)

We argue that modeling trade imbalances is crucial for understanding transitional dynamics in response to globalization shocks. We build and estimate a general equilibrium, multicountry, multisector model of trade with two key ingredients: (i) endogenous trade imbalances arising from households’ consumption and saving decisions; (ii) labor market frictions across and within sectors. We use our model to perform several empirical exercises. We find that the “China shock” accounted for 28% of the decline in U.S. manufacturing between 2000 and 2014—1.65 times the magnitude predicted from a model imposing balanced trade. A concurrent rise in U.S. service employment led to a negligible aggregate unemployment response. We benchmark our model’s predictions for the gains from trade against the popular ACR sufficient-statistics approach. We find that our predictions for the long-run gains from trade and consumption dynamics significantly diverge.