ABSTRACT In this paper, we exploit the open nature of conference calls to explore whether managers withhold information from the investing public. Our evidence suggests that managers regularly leave participants on the conference call in the dark by not answering their questions. We find that the best predictors of such an event are firm size, a CEO's stock price–based incentives, company age, firm performance, litigation risk, and whether analysts are actively involved during the call's Q&A section. Finally, we document strong support for the assumption maintained in the literature that investors interpret silence negatively. That is, investors seem to interpret no news as bad news.

How do the distance constraints faced by lenders in acquiring borrower information affect the design of bank loan contracts? Theoretical studies posit that greater information asymmetry leads to the allocation of stronger ex ante decision rights to the lender (the uninformed party). Consistent with this hypothesis, we find that, upon inception, contracts tend to be more restrictive when firms seek loans from remote lenders. This finding is robust to potential endogeneity bias and simultaneity of various loan terms. Overall, we establish a strong informational link between distance and loan contract design.

We adapt simple tools from computational linguistics to construct a new measure of political risk faced by individual U.S. firms: the share of their quarterly earnings conference calls that they devote to political risks. We validate our measure by showing that it correctly identifies calls containing extensive conversations on risks that are political in nature, that it varies intuitively over time and across sectors, and that it correlates with the firm’s actions and stock market volatility in a manner that is highly indicative of political risk. Firms exposed to political risk retrench hiring and investment and actively lobby and donate to politicians. These results continue to hold after controlling for news about the mean (as opposed to the variance) of political shocks. Interestingly, the vast majority of the variation in our measure is at the firm level rather than at the aggregate or sector level, in the sense that it is captured neither by the interaction of sector and time fixed effects nor by heterogeneous exposure of individual firms to aggregate political risk. The dispersion of this firm-level political risk increases significantly at times with high aggregate political risk. Decomposing our measure of political risk by topic, we find that firms that devote more time to discussing risks associated with a given political topic tend to increase lobbying on that topic, but not on other topics, in the following quarter.

We construct text-based measures of the primary concerns listed firms associated with the spread of COVID-19 and other epidemic diseases. We identify which firms perceive to lose or gain from a given epidemic and textually decompose the epidemic’s effect on the firm’s demand and supply. We find that the effects of COVID-19 manifest as a simultaneous shock to demand and supply, with both shocks affecting firms’ market valuations in equal measure on average. By contrast, demand-related impacts appear more important in accounting for the observed collapse in firm-level investment during the COVID-19 crisis. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online

ABSTRACT This paper examines how firms’ tax policy expectations (TPE) evolve around and relate to their investment responses to changes in tax policy. Using a text‐based approach to measuring TPE, we find that two recent tax policy–changing events—namely, the 2016 U.S. presidential election and the enactment of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA)—spawned considerable between‐ and within‐firm variation in TPE, with aggregate time‐series patterns in TPE occasionally challenging prevailing assumptions in previous research. Further, we observe that event‐induced TPE relate to investment both before and in response to the TCJA's passage in 2017, with offsetting associations between its first and second moments, and that these TPE moderate the TCJA's intended investment‐stimulating effect. Furthermore, we document a difference between domestic and multinational firms in their TPE‐investment response, with the former (latter) more likely to adjust the level (shift the country location) of their investment. Overall, our findings support the idea that TPE can impact investment behavior in the face of a tax policy change and suggest that our methodology can be used by future research to incorporate TPE into analyses of tax policy effects.

ABSTRACT We propose a text‐based method for measuring the cross‐border propagation of large shocks at the firm level. We apply this method to estimate the expected costs, benefits, and risks of Brexit and find widespread reverberations in listed firms in 81 countries. International (i.e., non‐U.K.) firms most exposed to Brexit uncertainty (the second moment) lost significant market value and reduced hiring and investment. International firms also overwhelmingly expected negative first‐moment impacts from the U.K.'s decision to leave the European Union (EU), particularly related to regulation, asset prices, and labor market impacts of Brexit.