Many institutions are attracted to diversified portfolios of hedge funds, referred to as Funds of Hedge Funds (FoHFs). In this article, we examine a new database that separates out for the first time the effects of diversification (the number of underlying hedge funds) from scale (the magnitude of assets under management). We find with others that the variance-reducing effects of diversification diminish once FoHFs hold more than 20 underlying hedge funds. This excess diversification actually increases their left-tail risk exposure once we account for return smoothing. Furthermore, the average FoHF in our sample is more exposed to left-tail risk than are naïve 1/N randomly chosen portfolios. This increase in tail risk is accompanied by lower returns, which we attribute to the cost of necessary due diligence that increases with the number of hedge funds.

[By buying convertibles and shorting the underlying stock, hedge funds distribute equity exposure to well-diversified shareholders. We find that firms with characteristics that make seasoned equity offerings expensive are more likely to issue convertibles to hedge funds. We conclude that hedge funds provide opportunities for firms to issue convertible securities at a lower cost than seasoned equity by serving as relatively low-cost distributors of equity exposure. A higher fraction of a convertible is privately placed with hedge funds when institutional ownership, stock liquidity, issue size, concurrent stock repurchases, and limitations on callability suggest that shorting costs will be lower.]

This paper investigates the extent to which market risk, residual risk, and tail risk explain the cross-sectional dispersion in hedge fund returns. The paper introduces a comprehensive measure of systematic risk (SR) for individual hedge funds by breaking up total risk into systematic and fund-specific or residual risk components. Contrary to the popular understanding that hedge funds are market neutral, we find that systematic risk is a highly significant factor explaining the dispersion of cross-sectional returns while at the same time measures of residual risk and tail risk seem to have little explanatory power. Funds in the highest SR quintile generate 6% more average annual returns compared with funds in the lowest SR quintile. After controlling for a large set of fund characteristics and risk factors, systematic risk remains positive and highly significant, whereas the relation between residual risk and future fund returns continues to be insignificant. Hence, systematic risk is a powerful determinant of the cross-sectional differences in hedge fund returns.

This paper studies operational risk in the hedge fund industry using due diligence reports. Many funds suffer from operational problems, including limited disclosure of legal and regulatory issues. We use direct evidence of inadequate or failed internal processes to derive a canonical correlation-based measure for operational risk consistent with the Basel definition. It controls for selection bias using an extension of Heckman's (1979) procedure. Operational risk increases the likelihood of subsequent poor performance and fund disappearance, but does not influence investors’ return-chasing behavior. Our study emphasizes the importance of information verification in the context of financial intermediation.

Instead of using industry groups or asset pricing models to estimate the cost of capital we propose using risk equivalent classes known as basis assets. A basis asset is constructed by grouping firms together whose returns indicate they share a common risk exposure, which in theory permits a precise and accurate expected return estimate. Thus, knowing to which basis asset a firm belongs, the firm’s cost of capital can be obtained. Empirically, we show that basis assets lead to superior cost of capital estimates when compared with widely used industry groupings. This means we are no longer reliant on asset pricing models or industry groups to estimate the cost of capital of a firm.

By buying convertibles and shorting the underlying stock, hedge funds distribute equity exposure to well-diversified shareholders. We find that firms with characteristics that make seasoned equity offerings expensive are more likely to issue convertibles to hedge funds. We conclude that hedge funds provide opportunities for firms to issue convertible securities at a lower cost than seasoned equity by serving as relatively low-cost distributors of equity exposure. A higher fraction of a convertible is privately placed with hedge funds when institutional ownership, stock liquidity, issue size, concurrent stock repurchases, and limitations on callability suggest that shorting costs will be lower.