R&D investment reduces current profits, so short‐term pressure to hit profit targets may distort R&D. In the data, firms just meeting Wall Street forecasts have lower R&D growth and subsequent innovation, while managers just missing receive lower pay. But short‐termist distortions might not quantitatively matter if aggregation or equilibrium dampen their impact. So I build and estimate a quantitative endogenous growth model in which short‐termism arises naturally as discipline on conflicted managers and boosts firm value by about 1%. But short‐termism reduces R&D, and the social return to R&D is higher than the private return due to standard channels including knowledge spillovers and imperfect competition. So at the macro level, short‐termist distortions slow growth by 5 basis points yearly and lower social welfare by about 1%.

We embed diagnostic expectations in a workhorse neoclassical model with heterogeneous firms and risky debt. A realistic degree of overreaction estimated from US firms’ earnings forecasts generates realistic credit cycles. Good times produce economic and financial fragility, predicting future disappointment of expectations, low bond returns, and investment declines. To generate the size of spread increases observed during 2007–2009, the model requires only moderate negative shocks. Diagnostic expectations offer a realistic, parsimonious way to produce financial reversals in business cycle models. (JEL D84, E13, E22, E32, E44, G12, G32)

Abstract Uncertainty rises in recessions and falls in booms. But what is the causal relationship? We construct cross-country panel data on stock market returns to proxy for first- and second-moment shocks and instrument these with natural disasters, terrorist attacks, and political shocks. Our IV regression results reveal a robust negative short-term impact of second moments (uncertainty) on growth. Employing multiple vector autoregression estimation approaches, relying on a range of identifying assumptions, also reveals a negative impact of uncertainty on growth. Finally, we show that these results are reproducible in a conventional micro–macro business cycle model with time-varying uncertainty.

Firm managers likely have more information than outsiders. If managers strategically conceal information, market uncertainty will increase. We develop a dynamic corporate disclosure model, estimating the model using the management earnings forecasts of US public companies. The model, based on the buildup of reputations by managers over time, matches key facts about forecast dynamics. We find that 80% of firms strategically manage information, that managers have superior information around half of the time, and that firms conceal information about 40% of the time. Concealment increases market uncertainty by just under 8%, a sizable information loss.

Abstract We quantify the real implications of trade-offs between firm information disclosure and long-term investment efficiency. We estimate a dynamic equilibrium model in which firm managers confront realistic incentives to misreport earnings and distort their real investment choices. The model implies a socially optimal level of disclosure regulation that exceeds the estimated value. Counterfactual analysis reveals that eliminating earnings misreporting completely through disclosure regulation incentivizes managers to distort real investment. Lower earnings informativeness raises the cost of capital, which results in a 5.7% drop in average firm value, but more modest effects on social welfare and aggregate growth. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.

We investigate the role of uncertainty in business cycles. First, we demonstrate that microeconomic uncertainty rises sharply during recessions, including during the Great Recession of 2007–2009. Second, we show that uncertainty shocks can generate drops in gross domestic product of around 2.5% in a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with heterogeneous firms. However, we also find that uncertainty shocks need to be supplemented by first†moment shocks to fit consumption over the cycle. So our data and simulations suggest recessions are best modelled as being driven by shocks with a negative first moment and a positive second moment. Finally, we show that increased uncertainty can make first†moment policies, like wage subsidies, temporarily less effective because firms become more cautious in responding to price changes.

We explain a counterintuitive empirical finding: Firms facing more import competition do more innovation. In our model, factors are trapped inside a firm. An increase in import competition encourages a firm to innovate by reducing the opportunity cost of inputs. Without trapped factors, trade liberalization leads to a small permanent increase in the worldwide rate of growth. With trapped factors, firms that face more import competition do relatively more innovation. The extra innovation induced by trapped factors induces a small permanent increase in aggregate output, consumption, and welfare, generalizing the appropriate estimate of the gains from trade.

We propose a novel identification strategy to isolate exogenous immigration shocks across US counties, by interacting quasi-random variations in the composition of ancestry across counties with the contemporaneous inflow of migrants from different countries. We show a positive causal impact of immigration on local innovation and wages at the five-year horizon. The positive dynamic impact of immigration on innovation and wages dominates the short-run negative impact of increased labor supply. A structural estimation of a model of endogenous growth and migrations suggests the increased immigration to the United States since 1965 may have increased innovation and wages by 5 percent. (JEL J15, J22, J31, J61, O31, R11, R23)