This paper studies empirically how collateral protects the market value of defaultable bonds from changes in risk. We construct a measure of the risk protection from collateral, and estimate it under different economic conditions. Using yields from the euro bond market, we find that the risk protection from collateral is conditional, significantly stronger in both general and issuer-specific bad states. However, the collateral is risky, and a fall in the collateral value clearly lowers the risk protection. Consequently, the correlation between the bad state and the collateral value is crucial when assessing the risk reducing properties of collateral.

We study how optimal bank capital and bond risk are influenced by asset encumbrance, depositor preference, and bail-in resolution frameworks. Due to changes in optimal capital structure, the net effect on bond debt risk and valuation is small. The effects on shareholder value and public sector liability value are significant. A gap between optimal and required capital represents a cost to shareholders and increases the risk of regulatory arbitrage. The features of bank debt financing we analyze here may explain the stable cross-sectional variation in bank capital documented in literature. Based on a small sample of European banks, we find support for the central model predictions.