This paper examines investor welfare under two different liability regimes for holding auditors liable for investor losses, the due care and the strict liability regimes. In both regimes, the investor pays the expected legal liability cost to the auditor, and a portion of any subsequent damages awarded by the court is retained by the lawyer as a contingent fee, which is called the recovery friction. This study finds that the presence of the recovery friction leads to second-best efforts by the auditor and the manager. Investor welfare in the due care regime is higher than in the strict liability regime because the expected litigation cost for the investor is lower. Investor welfare is higher in the due care regime than in the strict liability regime even when audit effort in the due care regime is lower than audit effort in the strict liability regime.

ABSTRACT We examine the effects of the auditor's insurance role on audit quality and reporting conservatism. The investor pays for the auditor's penalty through the audit fees and expects to collect a portion of it—when the investor recovers the entire expected penalty, the insurance role is perfect. When the investment is exogenous, consistent with Watts' (2003a, 2003b) argument, we find that an increase in the auditor's insurance role improves audit quality and conservatism, because conservatism helps to reduce the auditor's legal liability. However, when the investment level is endogenous, we find that the investment level and conservatism decrease with increases in the auditor's insurance role, because conservatism helps to mitigate the deadweight loss of the legal liability cost.

This study tests whether the observed patterns in stock returns after quarterly earnings announcements are related to the proportion of firm shares held by institutional investors, a variable used by prior research to proxy for investor sophistication. Our findings show that the institutional holdings variable is negatively correlated with the observed post-announcement abnormal returns. Our findings also show that traditional proxies for transaction costs (i.e., trading volume, stock price) as well as firm size have little incremental power to explain post-announcement abnormal returns when institutional holdings is an explanatory variable. If institutional ownership is a valid proxy for investor sophistication, these findings suggest that the trading activity of unsophisticated investors underlies the predictability of stock returns after earnings announcements. However, tests evaluating the validity of institutional holdings as a proxy for investor sophistication yield only mixed results. This calls for caution in interpreting our findings.

Compared to non-family firms, family firms face less severe agency problems due to the separation of ownership and management, but more severe agency problems that arise between controlling and non-controlling shareholders. These characteristics of family firms affect their corporate disclosure practices. For S&P 500 firms, we show that family firms report better quality earnings, are more likely to warn for a given magnitude of bad news, but make fewer disclosures about their corporate governance practices. Consistent with family firms making better financial disclosures, we find that family firms have larger analyst following, more informative analysts’ forecasts, and smaller bid-ask spreads.

ABSTRACT We examine the causal effects of corporate governance on earnings management using shareholder‐sponsored proposals that pass or fail by a small margin of votes in annual shareholder meetings. This setting provides a causal estimate that overcomes concerns of endogeneity. Specifically, compared with firms whose shareholder proposals fall just short of a majority threshold, firms whose shareholder proposals narrowly pass have similar characteristics but a discretely higher likelihood of implementing improvements in governance. As such, we expect that firms whose shareholder proposals pass the threshold by a small margin exhibit a significantly lower level of earnings management. Employing a regression discontinuity design, we find results that support our expectation based on the propensity to just meet or beat analysts' forecasts by one cent as a proxy for earnings management. In addition, we show that the results are driven by governance changes that increase directors' monitoring. Our results are robust to using discretionary accruals as an alternative measure of earnings management. Collectively, the results suggest that improvements in corporate governance curtail earnings management, and support the underlying premise of regulators that improvements in corporate governance would improve financial reporting.

Recently, a growing body of literature has suggested that financial statements have lost their value‐relevance because of a shift from a traditional capital‐intensive economy to a high‐technology, service‐oriented economy. These conclusions are based on studies that find a temporal decline in the association between stock prices and accounting information (earnings and book values). This paper empirically tests a theoretical prediction arising from the noisy rational expectations equilibrium model that suggests that the decline could be driven by non‐information‐based (NIB) trading activity, because such trading reduces the ability of stock prices to reflect accounting information. Specifically, Dontoh, Radhakrishnan, and Ronen (2004) show that when NIB trading increases, the R 2 s of a regression of stock price on accounting information declines. Our empirical tests confirm this prediction; that is, the decline in the association between stock prices and accounting information as measured by R 2 s is driven by an increase in NIB trading.

ABSTRACT We consider an investor's choice of conservative reporting, bonus payments, and investment decisions in the presence of the hidden‐information agency problem of a manager's productivity and the hidden‐action agency problem of a manager's diversion of resources. It is important to consider the hidden‐action and hidden‐information agency problems in isolation and their interaction to gain insights into the drivers of demand for conservatism. We show that the conservative (nonconservative) regime is optimal for the high‐productivity (low‐productivity) manager when both agency problems exist, even though the nonconservative regime is optimal for both the high‐ and low‐productivity managers when only the hidden‐action or the hidden‐information problem exists. Essentially, the low‐productivity manager can misrepresent as the high‐productivity manager to obtain high investment levels and divert resources only in the presence of both agency problems. This added layer of agency problem creates the demand for conservatism and highlights the importance of the interaction between the hidden‐action and hidden‐information agency problems. Furthermore, we show that as the conservatism level increases (i) the optimal investment level conditional on a good report for the high‐productivity manager increases and approaches the first‐best level (i.e., ex‐post investment efficiency increases); (ii) the expected optimal investment level for the high‐productivity manager decreases and diverges from the expected first‐best level (i.e., ex‐ante investment efficiency decreases); and (iii) the expected bonus payment to the high‐ and low‐productivity managers decreases. These findings provide insights into how the demand for conservatism arises in the presence of both hidden‐information and hidden‐action agency problems and provide empirical guidance relating conservatism to investment efficiency.