The return premium associated with the Amihud (2002) measure is generally considered a liquidity premium that compensates for price impact. We find that the pricing of the Amihud measure is not attributable to the construction of the return-to-volume ratio intended to capture price impact, but is driven by the trading volume component. Additionally, the high-frequency price impact and spread benchmarks are priced only in January and do not explain the pricing of the trading volume component of the Amihud measure. Additional analyses suggest that the volume effect on stock return is likely caused by mispricing, not by compensation for illiquidity.

[This paper examines the relationship between default probability and stock returns. Using the Expected Default Frequency (EDF) of Moody' s KMV, we document that higher default probabilities are not associated with higher expected stock returns. Within a model of bargaining between equity holders and debt holders in default, we show that the relationship between default probability and equity return is (i) upward sloping for firms where shareholders can extract little benefit from renegotiation (low "shareholder advantage") and (ii) humped and downward sloping for firms with high shareholder advantage. This dichotomy implies that distressed firms with stronger shareholder advantage should exhibit lower expected returns in the cross section. Our empirical evidence, based on several proxies for shareholder advantage, is consistent with the model's predictions.]

[Institutions often have access to corporate inside information through their connections, but relatively little is known about the extent to which they exploit their informational advantage through short-term trading. We employ broker-level trading data to systematically examine possible cases of connected trading. Despite examining the issue from multiple angles, we are unable to find much evidence to support that investment bank clients take advantage of connections through takeover advising, IPO and SEO underwriting, or lending relationships. In contrast to recent academic literature and popular press, our findings suggest that institutional investors are reluctant to use inside information in traceable manners.]

The return premium associated with the Amihud (2002) measure is generally considered a liquidity premium that compensates for price impact. We find that the pricing of the Amihud measure is not attributable to the construction of the return-to-volume ratio intended to capture price impact, but is driven by the trading volume component. Additionally, the high-frequency price impact and spread benchmarks are priced only in January and do not explain the pricing of the trading volume component of the Amihud measure. Additional analyses suggest that the volume effect on stock return is likely caused by mispricing, not by compensation for illiquidity. Received September 20, 2014; editorial decision April 16, 2017 by Editor Andrew Karolyi.

Twitter posts covering 1,082 firms from November 2008 to June 2011 reveal that sentiment in nonlocal Twitter posts is negatively related to future returns, and this negative relation is due to nonlocal posts favoring overpriced stocks, which earn lower subsequent returns. In contrast, local posts do not exhibit this failing. Since nonlocal posts dominate social media, this result highlights the danger of a naive reliance on social media sentiment. The nonlocal disadvantage is larger for firms without public news and firms with higher information asymmetry, suggesting that richer information constrains the exuberance of nonlocal investors.

The IPO volume in the US significantly decreased after 2000, as more entrepreneurial firms exited through acquisitions rather than IPOs. Using proprietary U.S. Census data on private firms, we examine several new hypotheses to explain these phenomena. Our results support explanations based on standalone public firms’ greater sensitivity to product market competition as well as private firms’ obtaining access to more abundant PE financing in the post2000 era. In contrast, we do not find evidence consistent with an eroded private firm base after 2000 or with the economies of scope explanation that mainly focuses on firm size.

Institutions often have access to corporate inside information through their connections, but relatively little is known about the extent to which they exploit their informational advantage through short-term trading. We employ broker-level trading data to systematically examine possible cases of connected trading. Despite examining the issue from multiple angles, we are unable to find much evidence to support that investment bank clients take advantage of connections through takeover advising, IPO and SEO underwriting, or lending relationships. In contrast to recent academic literature and popular press, our findings suggest that institutional investors are reluctant to use inside information in traceable manners.

Despite the theoretical appeal of the importance of the uniqueness of firm relation in merger synergy creation, empirical evidence supporting this synergy source is limited. We examine the effect of the uniqueness of the bidder-target relationship, i.e., the number of firms that share the bidder-target relationship, on merger synergies. We use machine learning tools to measure unique bidder-target relatedness and find that unique relatedness is associated with a much larger increase in merger synergies than non-unique relatedness. The measure of unique relatedness mostly captures product relatedness, and this measure dominates alternative product relatedness measures in predicting merger synergies. Analysis of the acquirer's post-merger operating performance shows that the unique relatedness creates synergies through enhanced operating efficiency rather than increased investment or revenue.

Despite a large literature on discretionary accruals, how the use of discretionary accruals impacts corporate financial decisions is not well understood. We hypothesize that a financially constrained firm with valuable projects can use discretionary accruals to credibly signal positive prospects, enabling it to raise capital to make the investments. We examine a large panel of firms during 1987 to 2009 and find that financially constrained firms with good investment opportunities have significantly higher discretionary accruals prior to investment compared to their unconstrained counterparts. Constrained high-accrual firms have higher earnings-announcement returns than constrained low-accrual firms, obtain more equity and debt financing, and invest in projects that appear to improve performance. These results provide supporting evidence that the use of discretionary accruals can help constrained firms with valuable projects ease those constraints and increase firm value. Data Availability: Data are available from public sources indicated in the text.