We study a publicly traded firm that cares about its short-term stock market performance while collaborating with a privately owned firm in a business alliance. The firms each undertake a relation-specific investment and then bargain over the allocation of the joint surplus generated by the alliance. The public firm’s myopic market concerns affect both the total size of the surplus and how the firms divide the surplus. While the public firm always becomes more aggressive and obtains more of the surplus, the total size of the surplus may become larger or smaller, due to the effect of myopic market concerns on the firms’ investment incentives. We establish conditions under which the investment and the value of each firm increase or decrease with market concerns. The market concerns could mitigate or exacerbate the hold-up problem between the two firms and thus could either benefit or harm the whole business alliance. We also study two extensions with (i) the two investments being substitutes instead of complements and (ii) both firms being publicly listed. In both cases, the insights from our main model still hold.

We study how corporate taxation interacts with intrafirm incentive conflicts between shareholders and managers and how this interaction impacts the firm's economic decisions and outcomes. In our model, investment under asymmetric information facilitates entrenchment and rent extraction by the privately informed manager. We show that when the future investment payoff is exogenous, a corporate tax cut increases managerial rents, reduces pre‐tax investment profitability, increases the firm's optimal investment hurdle rate, and reduces investment. When the manager can exert upfront project development effort to increase the expected investment payoff, a tax rate reduction not only encourages more effort but also leads the firm to increase the investment hurdle rate to curtail rents. In equilibrium, a lower tax rate always benefits the manager, but the sensitivity of the project's return to the manager's effort determines whether the firm will increase or decrease investment in response to a tax cut, and whether the firm's resulting pre‐tax profit will increase or decrease. Overall, our study shows that intrafirm incentive conflicts can be an important factor in the interplay between tax incidence and economic efficiency, two central themes in corporate tax policy debates.

ABSTRACT We investigate a transfer pricing problem between two divisions within a decentralized firm. An upstream division produces an intermediate good that is used by another division within the firm and is also sold in an external market, where the firm competes with a rival selling a differentiated substitute product. Assuming that headquarters has imperfect information about the upstream division's private information and that communication is restricted, we identify conditions under which the firm will prefer a market‐based transfer price based on the market price set by the firm's rival rather than on the market price set by the upstream division. The two transfer prices affect the price‐setting incentives of the upstream division and its rival differently, and convey different levels of private‐cost information to the downstream division, which impacts internal trade efficiency. The relative performance of the two transfer pricing regimes depends on the relative size of internal versus external demand for the upstream division's good and on the degree of uncertainty about the upstream division's costs. Overall, our analysis provides new insights about how alternative market‐based transfer prices can coordinate decentralized decision‐making in the absence of a perfectly competitive intermediate market.

Options, restricted stock, bonuses tied to total shareholder return, and similar equity-based compensation contracts stipulate payments that depend on stock price. Any such contract is a function of shareholder value net of the compensation payment, because stock price (1) is proportional to this net value or “net outcome” and (2) anticipates compensation-related payments and dilution. The net outcome, in turn, is reduced by the payment and so depends on the contract. Standard moral hazard analyses, wherein contractual payments are based on the gross outcome before any payment to the agent, overlook this dependency. We characterize the optimal net-outcome contract, describe its shape and pay-for-performance sensitivity, contrast it with the optimal gross-outcome contract, and discuss implications for equity-based compensation arrangements.

ABSTRACT We model two competing firms, each operating through their controlled subsidiaries while also holding a minority financial stake in their rival’s subsidiary. Under such cross-ownership, we derive the firms’ optimal disclosure policies, showing how they are affected by technological spillovers, competitive intensity, and the nature of product markets. The results demonstrate that cross-ownership induces more disclosures, benefiting the firm because disclosures promote the profit of its subsidiary (at low spillover values) or the rival’s subsidiary (at high spillover values). The increased transparency under cross-ownership can generate Pareto gains, improving consumer surplus and firm profits relative to separate ownership. This unifying finding holds under quantity and price competition, challenging the view that cross-ownership leads firms to collude, harming consumers. Additionally, with cross-ownership, high-spillover disclosures occur more under price than quantity competition. Thus, price competition can generate Pareto gains, contradicting the view that it favors consumers at the expense of firms. JEL Classifications: D43; D60; D82.

We model relative performance evaluation ( RPE ) when a Chief Executive Officer ( CEO ) has the power to opportunistically influence the design of RPE by choosing the weight on an index‐based peer group or by customizing the selection of peers comprising a peer group. A powerful CEO compares the benefits of reducing common risk affecting his compensation with the benefits of receiving a higher bonus by economizing on expected peer‐group performance. As a consequence, the Board of Directors (BoD) is less likely to use RPE . Our analytical model yields hypotheses predicting that powerful CEO s choose to reduce common risk only partially and that BoDs choose to not implement RPE if expected peer performance is sufficiently high. Our model has further empirical implications in (i) providing new interpretations of tests for detecting strong‐form and weak‐form RPE in the presence of powerful CEO s, and (ii) suggesting a new empirical measure of CEO power with a focus on the delegation of RPE decision rights.