I develop a model in which individual time discount rates have a larger effect on human capital accumulation when credit constraints are binding. Impatient individuals obtain less schooling when borrowing constraints limit the ability to finance consumption during school. Using data from the NLSY79, I show that self-reported measures of time preferences have a significantly higher effect on the college attendance decisions of blacks than those of whites and the decisions of low-income youths than those of high-income youths. These results provide new evidence that members of disadvantaged groups obtain lower levels of schooling because they are credit constrained.

Abstract We analyze the impact of a requirement similar to the Basel III Liquidity Coverage Ratio on the bank intermediation applying Regression Discontinuity Designs. Using a unique dataset on Dutch banks, we show that a liquidity requirement causes long-term borrowing and lending rates as well as demand for long-term interbank loans to increase. Lower levels of aggregate liquidity increase the estimated effects. Short-term borrowing and lending rates only rise during periods of lower market-wide liquidity. Further, banks do not seem able to pass on the increased funding costs in the interbank market to their private sector clients. Rather, a liquidity requirement seems to decrease banks’ interest margins.

We study the interaction between relationship banking and short-term arm’s length activities of banks, called trading. We show that a bank can use the franchise value of its relationships to expand the scale of trading, but may allocate too much capital to trading ex post, compromising its ability to build relationships ex ante. This effect is reinforced when trading is used for risk shifting. Overall, combining relationship banking and trading offers benefits under small-scale trading, but distortions may dominate when trading is unbridled. This suggests that trading by banks, while benign historically, might be distortive with deeper financial markets.

This paper offers a possible explanation for the conflicting results in the literature concerning the empirical relation between collateral and loan risk. We posit that differences in collateral characteristics, such as liquidity, may be associated with the empirical dominance of different risk-collateral relations implied by economic theory. Using credit registry data and a novel identification strategy to control for borrower and lender selection effects allows us to differentiate between the ex ante and ex post theories of collateral. We find that collateral overall is associated with lower risk premiums and higher default rates. The results indicate an important role for collateral in mitigating losses and reducing risk-taking incentives, consistent with ex post theories. Liquid collateral is associated with especially low risk premiums, and these loans perform better than those with illiquid collateral or no collateral. We also find that individual collateral types exhibit significant variation in terms of risk-collateral relations, with some consistent with ex ante theories and others with ex post theories. Our results suggest that the conflicting results in the literature may occur because different samples may be dominated by different types of collateral with different economic characteristics.

This study proposes and tests an alternative to the extant earnings management explanation for zero and small positive earnings surprises (i.e., analyst forecast errors). We argue that analysts’ ability to strategically induce slight pessimism in earnings forecasts varies with the precision of their information. Accordingly, we predict that the probability that a firm reports a small positive instead of a small negative earnings surprise is negatively related to earnings forecast uncertainty, and we present evidence consistent with this prediction. Our findings have important implications for the earnings management interpretation of the asymmetry around zero in the frequency distribution of earnings surprises. We demonstrate how empirically controlling for earnings forecast uncertainty can materially change inferences in studies that employ the incidence of zero and small positive earnings surprises to categorize firms as suspected of managing earnings.

This paper offers a historical perspective on the evolution of central banks as lenders of last resort (LOLR). Countries differ in the statutory powers of the LOLR, which is the outcome of a political bargain. Collateralized LOLR lending as envisioned by Bagehot (1873) requires five key legal and institutional preconditions, all of which required political agreement. LOLR mechanisms evolved to include more than collateralized lending. LOLRs established prior to World War II, with few exceptions, followed policies that can be broadly characterized as implementing “Bagehot's Principles”: seeking to preserve systemic financial stability rather than preventing the failure of particular banks, and limiting the amount of risk absorbed by the LOLR as much as possible when providing financial assistance. After World War II, and especially after the 1970s, generous deposit insurance and ad hoc bank bailouts became the norm. The focus of bank safety net policy changed from targeting systemic stability to preventing depositor loss and the failure of banks. Statutory powers of central banks do not change much over time, or correlate with country characteristics, instead reflecting idiosyncratic political histories.

We propose a simple model of non-exclusive financial advice in which two households rely on a self-interested (common) expert to make their investment choices. There is only one source of risk, and the expert is privately informed about the risky asset’s volatility. When monetary transfers are unenforceable, we show that investors may delegate their investment decisions to the expert. When doing so, however, they impose restrictions on her choices which crucially depend on whether the expert perceives investors’ asset allocations as complements or as substitutes. Finally, we analyze the implications of non-exclusivity in financial advice on investment behavior and welfare, and highlight a set of novel testable implications.

In nursing this essay through several drafts, I have benefited greatly from suggestions by Edward Denison, Robert Evenson, Zvi Griliches, Richard Levin, John Kendrick, Edwin Mansfield, and Richard Murnane. Moses Abramovitz has been a source ofencouragement and good, substantive editorial advice, for which I am most grateful. The heterodox views are my own, although I share many of them with Sidney Winter.

ABSTRACT We examine auditor switching conditional on the compatibility of clients and their auditors using a unique text‐based measure of similarity of financial disclosures. We find clustering of clients within an audit firm based on this measure. We find that clients with the lowest similarity scores are significantly more likely (9.4%–10.6%) to switch auditors, and will change to an audit firm to which they are more similar. Regarding the effect on audit quality, we find that discretionary accruals are lower when similarity is higher. However, accounting restatements are more likely when text disclosures that are unaudited—business description, and management discussion and analysis (MD&A)—are more similar. We find no such similarity effect for the audited footnotes. Finally, we find that firms that are more similar are less likely to receive a going concern opinion (GCO), but the GCO reporting decision is more accurate. It is unclear if this reflects higher or lower audit quality since firms that are candidates for a GCO are intrinsically different from the average firm in an auditor's portfolio due to their financial distress. One implication of these results is that auditors might have greater involvement in the quality of the text disclosures that are currently not audited.