This paper presents a structural econometric framework for discrete and continuous consumer choices in which unobserved intrapersonal and interpersonal preference heterogeneity is modeled explicitly. It outlines a simulation-assisted estimation methodology applicable in this framework. This methodology is illustrated in an application to analyze data from the U.C. Berkeley Internet Demand Experiment.

This paper considers structural non-parametric random utility models for continuous choice variables with unobserved heterogeneity. We provide sufficient conditions on random preferences to yield reduced-form systems of non-parametric stochastic demand functions that allow global invertibility between demands and non-separable unobserved heterogeneity. Invertibility is essential for global identification of structural consumer demand models, for the existence of well-specified probability models of choice and for the non-parametric analysis of revealed stochastic preference. We distinguish between new classes of models in which heterogeneity is separable and non-separable in the marginal rates of substitution, respectively.

Abstract In many markets, buyers make discrete choices between differentiated products and negotiate prices that are specific to the choice. We develop for estimation a model for this class of markets which is consistent with non-cooperative models of bargaining between a buyer and competing sellers. We show that when the buyer’s utility has GEV disturbances, the model has a tractable likelihood function which can be used with transaction-level data giving the selected product and its price. We estimate the model using data from the UK brick industry and use it to measure market power and analyse mergers. We analyse how spatial differentiation and ownership concentration affect the distribution of market power across transactions. In counterfactuals we find that switching from individually negotiated to uniform pricing causes markups, and merger price effects, to increase on average but to decrease for a minority of transactions.