“More than half the people of the world are living in conditions approaching misery … For the first time in history, humanity possesses the knowledge and the skill to relieve the suffering of these people. ” Harry S. Truman, Inaugural Address, 1949 “We have the opportunity in the coming decade to cut world poverty by half. Billions more people could enjoy the fruits of the global economy…And for the first time, the cost is utterly affordable. ” United Nations Millennium Project, 2005 The repetition of virtually the same language after more than half a century and $2.5 trillion worth of development assistance (in today’s dollars) is not encouraging for its promise to achieve the reduction of poverty and misery. This paper argues that development assistance as originally conceived and still largely conceived today, was a mistake. This is not based on any original research undertaken for this paper, it is just drawing the natural implication of a large body of literature quickly surveyed here. 1 The conclusion of the paper will argue that foreign aid could still accomplish some good things for poor people, even if it cannot fulfill the purpose of “development assistance.”

The Great Leveler: Violence and the History of Inequality from the Stone Age to the Twenty-first Century’s thesis is that violence and only violence significantly reduces inequality. It shows supportive cases of violence reducing inequality, especially World War II and the Russian and Chinese Revolutions, and highlights recent peacetime increases in within-country inequality. The great virtue of the book is to present a lot of evidence on both sides for the readers to judge the thesis for themselves. Other historical evidence is not supportive. Other measures of inequality, like absolute poverty or inequality between countries or groups, show many examples of violence making inequality or deprivation worse. The unequal burden of conscription, rationing, and casualties may also show war to be dis-equalizing. Also against the thesis is that recent peaceful globalization of trade, investment, and migration flows, including the rapid growth of China and India, has arguably reduced global inequality and absolute poverty to a historic extent. (JEL D31, D63, D74, F60, N30, N40)

In the new millennium, the Western aid effort toward Africa has surged due to writings by well-known economists, a celebrity mass advocacy campaign, and decisions by Western leaders to make Africa a major foreign policy priority. This survey contrasts the predominant “transformational” approach (West comprehensively saves Africa) to occasional swings to a “marginal” approach (West takes one small step at a time to help individual Africans). Evaluation of “one step at a time” initiatives is generally easier than that of transformational ones either through controlled experiments (although these have been oversold) or simple case studies where it is easier to attribute outcomes to actions. We see two themes emerge from the literature survey: (1) escalation—as each successive Western transformational effort has yielded disappointing results (as judged at least by stylized facts, since again the econometrics are shaky), the response has been to try an even more ambitious effort and (2) the cycle of ideas—rather than a progressive testing and discarding of failed ideas, we see a cycle in aid ideas in many areas in Africa, with ideas going out of fashion only to come back again later after some lapse long enough to forget the previous disappointing experience. Both escalation and cyclicality of ideas are symptomatic of the lack of learning that seems to be characteristic of the “transformational” approach. In contrast, the “marginal” approach has had some successes in improving the well-being of individual Africans, such as the dramatic fall in mortality.

Jeffrey Sachs's new book (The End of Poverty: Economic Possibilities for Our Time, Penguin Press: New York, 2005) advocates a “Big Push” featuring large increases in aid to finance a package of complementary investments in order to end world poverty. These recommendations are remarkably similar to those first made in the 1950s and 1960s in development economics. Today, as then, the Big Push recommendation overlooks the unsolvable information and incentive problems facing any large-scale planning exercise. A more promising approach would be to design incentives for aid agents to implement interventions piecemeal whenever they deliver large benefits for the poor relative to costs.

A large research program in economics has established a persuasive link between institutions and economic development. But what does this imply for development policymaking? Can a political leader or aid agency seeking to promote development readily change institutions? This article starts off wildly general, and then moves to specifics.

In an extraordinarily influential paper, Craig Burnside and David Dollar (2000, p. 847) find that “... aid has a positive impact on growth in developing countries with good fiscal, monetary, and trade policies but has little effect in the presence of poor policies.” This finding has enormous policy implications. The Burnside and Dollar (2000, henceforth BD) result provides a role and strategy for foreign aid. If aid stimulates growth only in countries with good policies, this suggests that (1) aid can promote economic growth, and (2) it is crucial that foreign aid be distributed selectively to countries that have adopted sound policies. International aid agencies, public policy makers, and the press quickly recognized the importance of the BD findings. This paper reassesses the links between aid, policy, and growth using more data. The BD data end in 1993. We reconstruct the BD database from original sources and thus (1) add additional countries and observations to the BD data set because new information has become available since they conducted their analyses, and (2) extend the data through 1997. Thus, using the BD methodology, we reexamine whether aid influences growth in the presence of good policies. Given our focus on retesting BD, we do not summarize the vast pre-BD literature on aid and growth. We just note that there was a long and inconclusive literature that was hampered by limited data availability, debates about the mechanisms through which aid would affect growth, and disagreements over econometric specification (see Gustav F. Papanek, 1972; Robert Cassen, 1986; Paul Mosley et al., 1987; Peter Boone, 1994, 1996; and Henrik Hansen and Finn Tarp’s 2000 review). Since BD found that aid boosts growth in good policy environments, there have been a number of other papers reacting to their results, including Paul Collier and Jan Dehn (2001), CarlJohan Dalgaard and Hansen (2001), Patrick Guillaumont and Lisa Chauvet (2001), Hansen and Tarp (2001), Robert Lensink and Howard White (2001), and Collier and Dollar (2002). These papers conduct useful variations and extensions (some of which had already figured in the pre-BD literature), such as introducing additional control variables, using nonlinear specifications, etc. Some of these papers confirm the message that aid only works in a good policy environment, while others drive out the aid policy interaction term with other variables. This literature has the usual limitations of choosing a specification without clear guidance from theory, which often means there are more plausible specifications than there are data points in the sample. We differentiate our paper from these others by NOT deviating from the BD specification. Thus, we do not test the robustness of the results to an unlimited number of variations, but instead maintain the BD methodology. This paper conducts a very simple robustness check by adding new data that were unavailable to BD. Thus, we expand the sample used over their time period and extend the data from 1993 to 1997. * Easterly: Department of Economics, New York University, 269 Mercer Street, New York, NY 10003, Center for Global Development, and National Bureau of Economic Research (e-mail: [email protected]); Levine: Department of Finance, Carlson School of Management, University of Minnesota, 321 19th Avenue South, Minneapolis, MN 55455, and National Bureau of Economic Research (e-mail: [email protected]); Roodman: Center for Global Development, 1776 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20036 (e-mail: [email protected]). We are grateful to Craig Burnside for supplying data and assisting in the reconstruction of previous results, without holding him responsible in any way for the work in this paper. Thanks also to Francis Ng and Prarthna Dayal for generous assistance with updating the Sachs-Warner openness variable, and to three anonymous referees, Craig Burnside, and Henrik Hansen for helpful comments. 1 See, for instance, the World Bank (1994, 2001, 2002), the U.K. Department for International Development (2000), President George W. Bush’s speech (March 16, 2002), the announcement by the White House on creating the Millennium Challenge Corporation (White House, 2002), as well as a Washington Post editorial (February 9, 2002), a Financial Times column by Alan Beattie (March 11, 2002), and The Economist (March 16, 2002).

We provide evidence that increased political influence, arising from CIA interventions during the Cold War, was used to create a larger foreign market for American products. Following CIA interventions, imports from the US increased dramatically, while total exports to the US were unaffected. The surge in imports was concentrated in industries in which the US had a comparative disadvantage, not a comparative advantage. Our analysis is able to rule out decreased trade costs, changing political ideology, and an increase in US loans and grants as alternative explanations. We provide evidence that the increased imports arose through direct purchases of American products by foreign governments. (JEL D72, F14, F54, N42, N72)