This paper examines the return spillovers between Exchange-Traded Funds (ETFs) and stocks. While traditional approaches focus on proportional relationships between ETFs and their underlying assets, we develop a high-dimensional network framework that captures spillover effects between any ETF-stock pair, regardless of their compositional relationship. By separating idiosyncratic and systematic risks, we investigate potential drivers of contagion. We document substantial heterogeneity in spillover patterns across sectors, which is previously unaddressed in the literature. Sectors such as Utilities and Real Estate exhibit robust spillovers to both their component stocks and assets in other sectors. Conversely, in sectors such as Consumer Discretionary and Finance , cross-sector influences dominate intra-sector ETF-constituent linkages. Our results also highlight that during periods of high market volatility, sources of idiosyncratic contagion become more diverse, suggesting the need for broader market surveillance beyond the few most influential ETFs.

Abstract Previous research finds that EPS growth rates are difficult to predict and reasons that much of the observed cross-sectional variation in valuation ratios is due to variation in implied future stock returns. Yet the observed cross-sectional relation between valuation ratios and realized future stock returns is weak. We revisit these findings using a refined measure of expected EPS growth rates and document robust evidence of predictability in EPS growth rates. Moreover, we find that this predictable growth extends beyond two years into the future and is strongly reflected in observed valuation ratios. We show that combining valuation ratios with our refined measure of expected EPS growth rates improves forecasts of stock returns, though return predictability remains weak. Thus, we conclude that most of the variation in valuation ratios is driven by predictable EPS growth.

ABSTRACT This paper investigates the role of corporate financial reports in the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) regulatory activities. By tracking the EPA's direct retrieval of SEC filings, we identify three key findings. First, the EPA retrieves a large volume of financial reports, especially from firms in high‐pollution industries. Second, the EPA is more likely to access financial reports during enforcement investigations and significant rule proposals, but less so during compliance monitoring, with patterns varying predictably across firms. Third, the EPA's reliance on financial reports is potentially driven by its demand for information on firm liquidity, solvency, and profitability. Overall, our study highlights the usefulness of financial reports for the EPA as an environmental regulator.

We construct hypothetical copycat funds to investigate the performance of free-riding strategies that duplicate the disclosed asset holdings of actively managed mutual funds. On average, copycat funds are able to generate performance that is comparable to their target mutual funds, taking into account transaction costs and expenses. However, their relative success increased significantly after 2004 when the SEC imposed quarterly disclosure regulations on all mutual funds. We also find substantial cross-sectional dispersion in the relative performance of copycat funds. Free-riding on the portfolios disclosed by past winning funds and funds that disclose representative holdings generates significantly better performance net of trading costs and expenses than the vast majority of mutual funds. The results indicate that free-riding on disclosed fund holdings is an attractive strategy and suggest that mutual funds can suffer from the information disclosure requirements.

Abstract We develop a rating system to evaluate the quality of individual non-GAAP exclusions. Our perspective is that high-quality exclusions reflect nonrecurring economic transactions, are transitory accounting adjustments, or have little usefulness in forecasting cash flows. We use four approaches to rate exclusions. We evaluate the serial correlation of the exclusion, survey accounting academics’ views, obtain practitioner ratings from the CFA Institute, and identify the exclusions approved by the Chinese securities regulator. A firm’s exclusion quality score is the weighted average rating of its individual exclusions. For our sample of S&P 500 firms, we document that exclusion quality varies by industry, captures trends in non-GAAP reporting, and is reasonably stable at the firm level. To validate the rating, we show that firms with lower exclusion quality scores receive more SEC comment letters, incur more Regulation G violations, exhibit greater analyst forecast dispersion, and have slower price discovery following earnings announcements.

Abstract Product market advertising, while containing little new information, triggers spikes in investor attention. Using weekly advertising data, we find that sell‐side analysts issue optimistic earnings forecasts in response to heavier advertising in the prior week. This effect is not driven by confounding earnings or product news. It is more pronounced for experienced analysts and analysts affiliated with brokerages that rely solely on trading revenues. The optimistic forecast bias intensifies the impact of advertising on investor trades of the underlying stock during the following week, especially on retail buying. Overall, analysts appear to issue optimistic forecasts to exploit retail investor attention spikes induced by advertising.

ABSTRACT This paper investigates whether maintaining a reputation for consistently beating analysts' earnings expectations can motivate executives to move from “within GAAP” earnings management to “outside of GAAP” earnings manipulation. We analyze firms subject to SEC enforcement actions and find that these firms consistently beat analysts' quarterly earnings forecasts in the three years prior to the manipulation period and continue to do so by smaller “beats” during the manipulation period. We find that manipulating firms beat expectations around 86 percent of the time in the 12 quarters prior to the manipulation period (versus 75 percent for control firms) and that manipulation often ends with a miss in expectations. We document that executives of manipulating firms face strong stock market and CEO pressure to perform. Prior to the manipulation period, these firms have high analyst optimism, growing institutional interest, and high market valuations, along with powerful CEOs. Further, we find that maintaining a reputation for beating expectations is more important than CEO overconfidence and is incremental to CEO equity incentives for explaining manipulation. Our results suggest that pressure to maintain a reputation for beating analysts' expectations can encourage aggressive accounting and, ultimately, earnings manipulation.

Abstract We examine whether auditors share private information about some clients in their portfolio to benefit other clients (i.e., brokerage houses). This is a salient issue in China, where there are concerns about auditors leaking information to related parties, and where we observe variation in connectedness between brokerage houses and companies through shared auditors. We document that brokerage houses that share an auditor with a company issue comparatively more accurate earnings forecasts for that company. Next, cross‐sectional variation in forecast accuracy is associated with several proxies for brokerage houses' and auditors' costs and incentives to share information (e.g., investor protection, media coverage, public listing status, and the client's economic importance). Finally, auditors are more likely to secure future audits from IPO deals sponsored by brokerage house clients with higher forecast accuracy. Collectively, our evidence is suggestive of auditors sharing private information with brokerage houses in anticipation of reciprocity in the form of lucrative future engagements.

Abstract We analyze the effects of limited investor attention on the stock market reaction to innovation announcements and develop a new measure of patents’ economic value. We hypothesize that, when some investors pay delayed attention to innovation announcements, there will be a post-announcement drift in addition to the announcement effect, with the former decreasing and the latter increasing in investor attention. Using media coverage and abnormal Google search volume as investor attention proxies, we find consistent evidence. Our new attention-weighted measure of patents’ economic value has greater predictive power for future firm performance than measures based on the announcement effect alone.