This paper examines the impacts of technology training and buyer-supplier relationship on technology adoption and quality upgrading. We randomly varied subjects of each training group across farmer-exporter clusters—farmers, exporters, both, or none—and provided training on Good Agricultural Practices (GAP). We find that training farmers enhances technology adoption and quality upgrading. Yet, the effects are much stronger when farmers and exporters are trained together. We document a plausible mechanism to explain this finding: joint training improves buyer-supplier relationship, which facilitates contract trade between farmers and exporters. We find no effect of GAP certification eligibility on technology adoption.

We develop a continuous-time general equilibrium model with intermediaries at the heart of international financial markets. Global intermediaries bargain with households and extract rents from providing access to foreign claims. By tilting state prices, intermediaries’ market power breaks monetary neutrality and makes international risk-sharing inefficient. Despite having zero net positions, markups charged by intermediaries significantly distort international asset prices, affecting exchange rate dynamics and their response to shocks. Our model can reproduce patterns consistent with several well-known exchange rate puzzles, such as deviations from uncovered and covered interest parity. All equilibrium quantities are derived in closed form, allowing us to pin down the underlying economic mechanisms explicitly.