This paper studies the role of scale inflexibility in explaining corporate credit spreads. We find robust evidence that firms with higher inflexibility have higher credit spreads. To mitigate the endogeneity concern, we employ a regression discontinuity design that uses the exogenous variations in labor adjustment costs resulting from close-call union elections. Furthermore, contraction inflexibility is more prominent in influencing credit spreads than expansion inflexibility is. Additionally, inflexibility increases credit spreads due to increased cash flow volatility and financial distress risk. Our findings highlight the importance of a firm’s ability to adapt to productivity shocks in fulfilling its debt obligations. (JEL G12, G30, G32)

This paper examines the effect of a firm's crash-risk exposure on its speed of leverage adjustment (SOA), and how this effect is influenced by the information environment of the country in which the firm is located. We employ a panel of 19,247 firms across 41 countries from 1989 to 2013, and we find that firms with a higher crash-risk exposure tend to adjust their financial leverages more slowly toward their targets. This evidence supports the dynamic trade-off theory that firms with larger transaction costs adjust their capital structures less often. Equally important, we document that the negative link between crash-risk exposure and SOA is less pronounced in countries with a more transparent information environment.

Employing a large sample of 7246 firms across 38 economies from 2000 to 2013, we show a positive relation between foreign institutional ownership (FIO) and firms' speed of leverage adjustment. This positive relation is concentrated for over-leveraged firms that need to decrease financial leverage to rebalance their capital structures. We validate our findings using a 2SLS regression and a DiD estimation to exploit the exogenous variations in FIO generated by the inclusion of MSCI membership and the passage of the JGTRRA. These results suggest that foreign institutional investors play an important monitoring role in mitigating agency conflicts between shareholders and managers. Overall, this paper lends support to the dynamic trade-off theory.

Employing a sample of 4271 initial-industry acquisitions across 34 countries from 1989 to 2013, we show that the rival firms which are in the same industry as the target firms exhibit positive cumulative abnormal returns (CARs). In addition, those rivals with higher analyst coverage are associated with higher CARs. The results are robust to the natural experiment based on the exogenous decrease in analyst coverage (i.e., brokerage closure and merger). Careful comparisons of the results show dramatic differences between the United States (U.S.) and non-U.S. subsamples. We further show that a more transparent macro information environment can substitute for the role of financial analysts in determining the rival response. Overall, our findings support the Acquisition Probability Hypothesis.

This paper examines the effect of earnings management on financial leverage and how this relation is influenced by institutional environments by employing a large panel of 25,777 firms across 37 countries spanning the years 1989–2009. We find that firms with high earnings management activities are associated with high financial leverage. More importantly, this positive relation is attenuated by strong institutional environments. Our results lend strong support to the notions that (1) both corporate debt and institutional environments can be served as external control mechanisms to alleviate the agency cost of free cash flow; and (2) it is less costly to rely on institutional environments than debt. After meticulously addressing the possible endogeneity issues and conducting various robustness tests, our main conclusions remain confirmed.

Employing a sample of 4655 U.S. public firms from 1993 to 2017, we document robust evidence that firms with more registered trademarks have a lower cost of equity. We further show that the equity financing cost is lower for firms with better-protected trademarks in difference-in-differences estimation based on the enactment of the Federal Trademark Dilution Act in 1996. In addition, our analysis reveals that the effect of trademarks on the cost of equity is achieved through the informational channel, the disciplinary channel, and the stabilizing cash flow channel. These results suggest that trademarks play an important role in alleviating the equity financing cost, thus clarifying the underlying mechanism that brand equity creates value.

Spurred by the informational and disciplinary roles that the media fulfils, this study provides initial evidence on how higher media coverage is associated with a lower tendency of firms withholding bad news, proxied by stock price crash risk. Our main findings are robust to a battery of tests that account for endogeneity concerns including a difference-in-differences analysis based on newspaper closures that exogenously reduce media coverage and a regression-discontinuity design analysis based on the top band of Russell 2000 and lower band of Russell 1000 index stocks. Additional tests reveal that the negative relation between media coverage and stock price crash risk is concentrated within firms with more negative and novel news coverage and firms with higher litigation or reputation risks. We also find that media plays an important role in reducing future stock price crash risk when there is reduced monitoring by other external monitoring mechanisms such as external auditors, financial analysts, and institutional shareholders.