This paper examines the effect of creditor protection on the choice of government procurement contract types. We use the staggered adoption of anti-recharacterization laws (ARLs) as a quasi-natural experiment to investigate the research question. ARLs strengthen creditors’ rights to repossess collateral in bankruptcy and thus enhance creditor protection. Using a dataset of U.S. government contracts, we find a significant shift from the use of fixed-price contracts to cost-plus contracts after the adoption of ARLs. The effect is more pronounced for firms with higher default risk and stronger firm-government ties. We also find that the government is more likely to switch away or reduce the contract value for contractors affected by ARLs. Overall, our findings point to an important relation between debt contracts and government contracts.

This study examines the effect of bank loan monitoring on public bond contract design. We find that bond yield spreads are lower and that bond issuance amounts are larger when a borrower has recently obtained a private loan, consistent with bond issuers benefiting from the screening and ongoing monitoring of banks. We find that these bonds include more covenants than bonds issued without the cross-monitoring of banks, consistent with bondholders wanting to protect themselves from private lenders. This effect is larger for firms with high information asymmetry and larger potential conflicts between different lender types. Our results are robust to a battery of sensitivity tests. Overall, our empirical results suggest that borrowers that precede their public bond issuances with private loan agreements receive more favorable bond terms. Meanwhile, these benefits are associated with the cost of increased monitoring by public bonds.

We investigate whether accounting conservatism can be explained as a rational response to ambiguity. Decision analysis shows that decision rules that work well under ambiguity put greater weight on negative than on positive outcomes, i.e., exhibit caution. Accounting conservatism increases the timeliness of bad news that is more relevant under cautious decision rules and thereby helps corporate managers and investors implement them. We, therefore, hypothesize that firms facing greater ambiguity report more conservatively. We adopt two different measures to proxy for the firm-specific level of ambiguity. First, we identify firms pursuing the “prospector” versus “defender” business strategies. Compared with defenders, who focus on utilizing existing resources, prospectors actively create their future by seeking new business opportunities and thus face greater ambiguity. Second, we conduct an additional set of tests based on environmental scanning, which reduces ambiguity. Both sets of results suggest that firms facing greater ambiguity report more conservatively.

This study explores the association between firm innovation and loan covenant strictness. We find that lenders construct stricter contracts for firms filing more patents, consistent with lenders imposing more oversight on firms when they enter the commercialization stage after having demonstrated their inventiveness. Our results hold under propensity score matching and entropy balancing, and when exploiting the American Inventors Protection Act as a shock affecting unrelated banks’ access to patent filing information. The relationship we document is stronger when the lender has more expertise and for firms with higher default risk. We demonstrate that borrowers’ patent filings are associated with more future R&D and capital investment and with a higher likelihood of their acquiring firms in the industry of their patent filings. Our results are consistent with the theoretical prediction that lenders interpret patent filings as indicative of high inventive potential that requires stricter discipline and oversight by lenders in order to be converted into actual business success, and with them designing debt contract terms accordingly.

This study examines the relevance of modified audit opinions (MAO) in private debt contracting. We use the auditor׳s explanatory language to partition MAOs into Inconsistency opinions, resulting from an accounting change or a restatement; and Inadequacy opinions, arising from a material uncertainty or a going concern (GC) opinion. Using the loan contracts of firms with MAOs, we find that, compared with loans issued in the year after a clean opinion, loans issued in the year after an MAO are associated with higher interest spreads (17 basis points on average), fewer financial covenants, more general covenants, smaller loan sizes, and a higher likelihood of requiring collateral. We find that the effect on loan spreads (as well as on other non-price terms) varies by the type of MAO, ranging from no effect for an accounting change to an average increase of 107 basis points for a GC opinion. Additional analyses of GC opinions find that auditors communicate incremental information to lenders about clients’ credit risk. Overall, our empirical results suggest that lenders incorporate the information contained in MAOs into debt contracting.

We examine changes in bank loan contracts after borrowers experience a nearby local newspaper closure. Compared to a sample of control firms, we find that the closure of a local newspaper leads to higher interest spreads for borrowers. This effect is more pronounced when there are fewer related lenders in the syndicate, when lenders have less prior lending experience in the local area, when the closed local newspapers are associated with increases in misconduct cases, and for institutional lenders who rely more heavily on others for monitoring. In addition, we observe that loan contract amendments become less frequent, while covenant strictness increases following newspaper closures. Our main findings are robust to various research design specifications and are not driven by deteriorating local economic conditions. Our findings suggest that local media still plays a significant role in the debt markets, even as society moves deeper into the internet era.

ABSTRACT A recent trend is that firms prefer to hire generalist CEOs with transferable skills (across firms or industries) over hiring specialist CEOs, but the consequences of this trend are unclear. In this study, we examine whether credit rating agencies consider a CEO's general skills as a credit risk factor when assessing an entity's overall creditworthiness. We predict and find that generalist CEOs are associated with lower credit ratings, suggesting that the presence of generalist CEOs is a significant credit rating factor. We also find that generalist CEOs are likely to take on more risks, which leads to more volatile performance ex post, and our path analyses confirm default risk is a significant mediator between credit ratings and CEOs' general skills. Our results hold in the presence of additional controls (e.g., CEO characteristics and corporate governance), when applying different fixed‐effect models and different matching methods, and for a subsample with forced CEO turnover. We also find that the negative relationship is attenuated for R&D‐intensive firms and firms in competitive industries. Last, we provide evidence that firms with generalist CEOs face higher borrowing costs, such as bond yields and syndicated loan spreads. Overall, our results contribute to a growing literature on the costs and benefits of hiring generalist CEOs, by providing a full picture of why hiring a generalist CEO may benefit shareholders but also cause misalignments with bondholders' interests.

We analyze whether industry competition influences analyst coverage decisions and whether analysts benefit from covering product market competitors. We find that analysts are more likely to cover a firm when this firm competes with more firms already covered by the analyst. We also find that the intensity of competition among these competitors is additionally important to the coverage decision. Moreover, we find that analysts who cover product market competitors are more likely to obtain analyst star status. These results are consistent with the importance to analysts of industry competition and product market knowledge accumulated through covering product market competitors.

ABSTRACT We study how proprietary information flows in strategic alliances facilitate banks’ information collection in private debt markets. We argue that lenders that have previously worked with a borrower’s alliance partners have an information advantage and show that firms entering a strategic alliance receive a lower interest spread on loans from banks that have previously lent to their strategic partners than loans from other banks. Cross-sectional tests on alliances’ economic importance and participants’ information environment support our hypothesis that the loan price effect is driven by reduced information asymmetry between borrowers and their partners’ relationship banks. Last, we find borrowers are more likely to obtain debt financing from alliance-related banks than from other banks. Overall, our findings are consistent with lenders that have previously worked with an alliance counterparty possessing debt contracting-relevant information about the soft nature of alliance value and the partners’ commitment to alliances. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text. JEL Classifications: G10; G21; G32.