We show that concentrating bank regulation on bank capital ratios may be ineffective in controlling risk taking. We propose, instead, a more direct mechanism of influencing bank risk-taking incentives, in which the FDIC insurance premium scheme incorporates incentive features of top-management compensation. With this scheme, we show that bank owners choose an optimal management compensation structure that induces first-best value-maximizing investment choices by a bank's management. We explicitly characterize the parameters of the optimal management compensation structure and the fairly priced FDIC insurance premium in the presence of a single or multiple sources of agency problems

We show that concentrating bank regulation on bank capital ratios may be ineffective in controlling risk taking. We propose, instead, a more direct mechanism of influencing bank risk-taking incentives, in which the FDIC insurance premium scheme incorporates incentive features of top-management compensation. With this scheme, we show that bank owners choose an optimal management compensation structure that induces first-best value-maximizing investment choices by a bank's management. We explicitly characterize the parameters of the optimal management compensation structure and the fairly priced FDIC insurance premium in the presence of a single or multiple sources of agency problems

The current regulatory capital standard for banks – the Basle Accord – is a lose/lose proposition. Regulators cannot conclude that a bank with a nominally high regulatory capital ratio has a correspondingly low probability of insolvency. On the other hand, because the Accord often levies a capital charge out of proportion to the true economic risk of a position, banks must engage in “regulatory capital arbitrage” (or exit their low risk business lines). Since such arbitrage is costly, the capital regulations keep banks from maximizing the value of the financial firm. Regulators need to answer three questions: (1) What are the goals of prudential regulation and supervision? (2) How should bank “soundness” be defined and quantified? (3) At what level should a minimum “soundness” standard be set in order to meet the (perhaps conflicting) goals of prudential regulation and supervision? Possible answers to these questions are attempted, then the paper analyzes the two leading proposals for rationalizing the Accord – a “modified-Basle” (or ratings-based) approach and a “full-models” approach

We present evidence that managerial shareholdings are an important determinant of bank risk-taking. Managerial shareholdings are positively related to total and firm specific risk in the late 1980s when banking was relatively less regulated and when the industry was under considerable financial stress. However, following legislation in 1989 and 1991 designed to reduce risk-taking and also reflecting substantial improvements in bank franchise value, managerial shareholdings and total and firm specific risk became negatively related in the early 1990s. In contrast, systematic risk was unrelated to managerial ownership in both periods

Internal credit risk rating systems are becoming an increasingly important element of large commercial banks’ measurement and management of the credit risk of both individual exposures and portfolios. This article describes the internal rating systems presently in use at the 50 largest US banking organizations. We use the diversity of current practice to illuminate the relationships between uses of ratings, different options for rating system design, and the effectiveness of internal rating systems. Growing stresses on rating systems make an understanding of such relationships important for both banks and regulators

We study the stock market valuation of mergers and acquisitions in the European banking industry. Based on a sample of very large deals observed from 1988 to 1997 we document that, on average, at the announcement time the size-adjusted combined performance of both the bidder and the target is statistically significant and economically relevant. Although our sample shows a great deal of cross-sectional variation, the general results are mainly driven by the significant positive abnormal returns associated with the announcement of domestic bank to bank deals and by product diversification of banks into insurance. On the contrary, we found that M&A with securities firms and concluded with foreign institutions did not gain a positive market's expectation. Our results are remarkably different from those reported for US bank mergers. We explain our different results as stemming from the different structure and regulation of EU banking markets, which are shown to be more similar between them than as compared with the US one

In a dynamic model of moral hazard, competition can undermine prudent bank behavior. While capital-requirement regulation can induce prudent behavior, the policy yields Pareto-inefficient outcomes. Capital requirements reduce gambling incentives by putting bank equity at risk. However, they also have a perverse effect of harming banks' franchise values, thus encouraging gambling. Pareto-efficient outcomes can be achieved by adding deposit-rate controls as a regulatory instrument, since they facilitate prudent investment by increasing franchise values. Even if deposit-rate ceilings are not binding on the equilibrium path, they may be useful in deterring gambling off the equilibrium path

Over the past decade, commercial banks have devoted many resources to developing internal models to better quantify their financial risks and assign economic capital. These efforts have been recognized and encouraged by bank regulators. Recently, banks have extended these efforts into the field of credit risk modeling. However, an important question for both banks and their regulators is evaluating the accuracy of a model’s forecasts of credit losses, especially given the small number of available forecasts due to their typically long planning horizons. Using a panel data approach, we propose evaluation methods for credit risk models based on cross-sectional simulation. Specifically, models are evaluated not only on their forecasts over time, but also on their forecasts at a given point in time for simulated credit portfolios. Once the forecasts corresponding to these portfolios are generated, they can be evaluated using various statistical methods

Unless priced and administered appropriately, a governmental safety net enhances risk‐shifting opportunities for banks. This paper quantifies regulatory efforts to use capital requirements to control risk‐shifting by U.S. banks during 1985 to 1994 and investigates how much risk‐based capital requirements and other deposit‐insurance reforms improved this control. We find that capital discipline did not prevent large banks from shifting risk onto the safety net. Banks with low capital and debt‐to‐deposits ratios overcame outside discipline better than other banks. Mandates introduced by 1991 legislation have improved but did not establish full regulatory control over bank risk‐shifting incentives

This paper provides an overview of the major issues with respect to financial system development in transition economies, which were discussed at a conference in Groningen, the Netherlands, December 1997. After a brief remark on the role of financial system design during economic transition, the paper focuses on the role of stock markets in the process of financial intermediation with emphasis on the role of regulations in these markets, the role of deposit insurance to improve bank system stability, and the importance of an independent central bank, measurement issues relating to central bank independence and its impact on inflation and growth