Auditors are required to raise potential audit issues to their supervisor's attention (i.e., to speak up). Speaking up allows supervisors to adjust audit procedures as needed to protect audit quality. We argue that the act of speaking up may not always be sufficient to protect audit quality— how auditors speak up is critical. Drawing on audit voice theory (AVT), which focuses on whether auditors speak up, we consider the impact of auditors' salient goals on the tactics that auditors use when raising issues. Using a survey, multiple experiments, and an association study, we find that staff auditors with salient public service (vs. self‐serving) goals choose more quality‐enhancing voice tactics when speaking up. Importantly, however, we find that the voice‐related decisions of auditors with salient self‐serving (but not public service) goals respond to rewards for more quality‐enhancing tactics. These results support our theory that auditors approach voice differently depending on their salient goals, and they imply that supervisors can help auditors choose quality‐enhancing voice tactics even when self‐serving goals are salient. Overall, our findings test and extend AVT, identify a potential shortcoming of current audit standards, and suggest ways that firms can improve team communication and audit quality via recruitment strategies, team management practices, and training.

In this paper, we introduce the construct of proactive auditing behaviors to the accounting literature and report the first experimental investigation of their antecedents. Regulators and practitioners agree that proactive behaviors are needed to consistently achieve high‐quality audit outcomes, but also that these behaviors are scarce. Drawing on theory from management, accounting, and psychology, we predict that an environmental factor (autonomy) and a dispositional factor (tacit knowledge) interact to increase a range of distinct proactive auditing behaviors. These behaviors involve responding to evidence that has out‐of‐task implications, coordinating with clients to acquire task‐related evidence, and two forms of coaching junior auditors. As predicted, we find that auditors are more proactive when they have both higher autonomy and higher tacit knowledge than when they lack either or both factors. Our theory and findings inform academics, regulators, and practitioners about the types of work environments and policies that can promote auditor proactivity successfully.

Auditors have difficulty evaluating the assumptions underlying management's estimates. One source of these problems is that auditors appear to dismiss evidence contradicting management's assumptions because their initial preference to support management's accounting biases their preliminary conclusions and, thus, their interpretation of evidence. We experimentally examine whether auditors with a balanced focus (i.e., a focus on documenting evidence that supports and contradicts their preliminary conclusion) are less likely to dismiss evidence that contradicts management's assumptions than auditors with a supporting focus (i.e., a focus on documenting evidence that supports their preliminary conclusion). We expect and find that, compared with auditors with a supporting focus, auditors with a balanced focus create documentation that is less dismissive of evidence contradicting management's estimate. Importantly, a balanced focus changes auditors' cognition and affects how auditors interpret contradicting evidence rather than merely increasing their documentation of this evidence. The effects of reduced dismissiveness persist to improve auditors' evaluations of a biased estimate and subsequent actions, improving audit quality in an important and difficult area.

Distributed, rather than co‐located, teams increasingly perform audit work, raising regulator concerns that distributed team communication issues may affect audit quality. We investigate upward communication (i.e., raising issues to supervisors), a key communication dimension related to audit quality. In Study 1, we survey 69 senior auditors to establish that distributed team upward communication suffers. Furthermore, distributed team auditors identify less with their teams and struggle to know when and how to speak up. Because both are linked to inhibited upward communication, we next experimentally test firm practices with the potential to attenuate these problems. Study 2, an experiment with 128 staff auditors and interns, reveals that making auditors' professional identities salient improves upward communication on co‐located teams with strong team identities but not on distributed teams with weak team identities. Study 3, an experiment with 58 staff auditors, replicates a key Study 2 finding with a design that makes no reference to team identity strength. Specifically, in the presence of a salient professional identity, upward communication is significantly higher for co‐located relative to distributed team auditors. Study 4, an experiment with 69 staff auditors, focuses solely on distributed teams. It indicates that several distributed team management practices, including one‐on‐one and standing daily meetings, encourage upward communication. Finally, Study 5, informal interviews with eight audit seniors, corroborates key survey and experimental findings. Combined, our results provide insights into why distributed team communication suffers, refine audit voice theory, and provide regulators, practitioners, and researchers with multiple paths to improve audit quality.