H. Neudecker, Bounds for the Bias of the Least Squares Estimator of @s^2 in the Case of a First-Order Autoregressive Process (Positive Autocorrelation), Econometrica, Vol. 45, No. 8 (Nov., 1977), p. 2006
Charles J. Cicchetti, Anthony C. Fisher, V. Kerry Smith, An Econometric Evaluation of a Generalized Consumer Surplus Measure: The Mineral King Controversy, Econometrica, Vol. 45, No. 4 (May, 1977), p. 1041
A class of production correspondences defined as ray-homothetic is introduced to span the familiar homogeneous, homothetic, semi-homogeneous and quasi-homogeneous production structures. It is found that ray homothetic structures which are output mix (input mix) independent lead to a scaling law of common form with the more special structures spanned, and imply price independent expansion paths of linear structure. Also, if inputs and outputs are strongly disposable and the input and output sets L(u) and P(x) are convex, linear structured expansion paths imply input mix and output mix independent ray homothetic structures.
Much of the development of economic theory has been based on assumptions that credit economic agents with perfect discriminating power and perfect consistency in their choice behavior, but recently a range of less restrictive psychological choice theories has been introduced into economic analysis. These theories may be classed into two typesthose that treat preference (and hence choice) as a probabilistic phenomenon, and those that retain the deterministic structure of the traditional analysis but relax in some way the assumption that individual preferences be transitive. in previous work others have examined the implications for economic equilibrium of assuming preferences to be random; our purpose in this paper is to examine the equilibrium implications of a particularly attractive deterministic choice theory, that of semiordered preferences. We first examine an exchange ec such an economy is shown to have an equilibrium, and further, for interior equilibria, it is shown that a range of allocations to consumers is consistent with equilibrium. Finally, we show that in a semiorder market economy the set of price equilibria has a non-empty interior relative to the price simplex.
[This paper surveys various econometric issues that arise in estimating a relation between the logarithm of earnings, schooling, and other variables and focuses on the problem of "ability" as a left-out variable and the various solutions to it. It points out that in optimizing models the "ability bias" need not be positive and shows, using recent analyses of NLS data, that when schooling is treated symmetrically, allowing it too to be subject to errors of measurement and correlated to the disturbance in the earnings function, the usual conclusion of a significantly positive "ability bias" in the estimated schooling coefficients is not only not supported but possibly even reversed.]
This paper shows that no nondictatorial voting procedure exists that induces each voter to choose his voting strategy solely on the basis of his preferences and independently of his beliefs concerning other voters' preferences. This necessary dependence between a voter's beliefs and his choice of strategy means that a voter can manipulate another voter's choice of strategy by misleading him into adopting inaccurate beliefs concerning other voters' beliefs. CONSIDER A VOTING SITUATION, as in a committee. Each rational member has preferences over the alternatives being considered and beliefs concerning the other members' preferences. The question we consider in this short paper is: can a voting procedure be constructed such that each member's vote depends only on his preferences, not on his beliefs concerning other individual preferences. We show, by an application of Gibbard [6] and Satterthwaite's [11] impossibility theorem for strategy-proof voting procedures, that such a voting procedure does not exist. Moreover, we show that this necessary lack of independence between a member's beliefs and his choice of voting strategy makes him vulnerable to possible manipulation by other members. Specifically, consider members one and two. Since member one partially bases his vote on what he believes member two is seeking, member two may deliberately mislead member one into adopting a false belief concerning member two's preferences. As a consequence of this inaccurate belief, member one may decide to vote in a manner that is, in fact, unfavorable to himself and favorable to member two. Derivation of these results depends critically on the possibility that members may be uncertain concerning other members' preferences. This assumption is reasonable because the purpose of legislative bodies is to reconcile conflicting preferences. If preferences were generally known with certainty, then, as Wilson [14, p. 310] has pointed out, the need for a legislative body would vanish because preferences could be aggregated directly. Therefore, a realistic analysis of voting behavior must accept that a member's true preferences are private. Our results are consistent with the work that other researchers have reported. Dummett and Farquharson [3, pp. 34-35] and, to a lesser extent, NVilson [14] assumed the validity of our results. Harsanyi [7] in discussing bargaining situations where the two opponents are uncertain concerning the other's preferences argued that the decisive element may not be the actual preferences of the two individuals involved, but rather the societal stereotypes (beliefs) concerning their preferences. Schelling (12, e.g., Ch. 3] in his insightful discussion of bargaining strategy dwells extensively on the same theme.