Knowledge that Transforms

In an efficient capital market, asset prices vary when investors change their expectations about cash flows, discount rates, or both. Using dividends to measure cash flows, previous research shows that the aggregate dividend-price ratio varies due to changes in expected discount rates (returns) rather than expected cash flows. In contrast, using accounting earnings instead of dividends as a measure of cash flows, this paper shows that as much as 70% of the variation in the dividend-price ratio can be explained by changes in expected earnings. Moreover, the paper documents a significant negative correlation between expected returns and expected earnings, suggesting that variations in a common factor to both may generate significant price volatility. The results are consistent with the dividend-policy irrelevance hypothesis.

We investigate a sample of 50 firm-events, identified in the Global Research Analysts Settlement, in which analysts were discovered to have acted misleadingly ex post. In this setting, analysts' incentives caused them to issue public disclosures that differed from their private beliefs. We document that these firms' institutional holdings decline significantly during the period in which the analysts issued misleading disclosures. During this period daily small-size trades (a proxy for individual investors) are dominated by buy orders while daily large-size trades (a proxy for institutional investors) are dominated by sell orders. Short interest increases during the event period, consistent with the idea that sophisticated investors are selling. Our estimates of investors' trading losses show that individual investors lost about two and a half times the amount lost by institutions. Overall, the results suggest a wealth transfer from individuals to institutions that is likely attributable to analysts' misleading behavior.

We use the context of a company's initial public offering (IPO) of equity securities as a capital-markets setting to empirically study the economic consequences of endogenous disclosure. In particular, we examine the relation between the extent of dollar detail an IPO issuer provides regarding their intended use of proceeds and first-day underpricing. We document substantial variation in the specificity of this disclosure and find that an increase in such specificity is associated with lower IPO underpricing. Overall, our results suggest that IPOs that provide specific use-of-proceeds disclosures have less ex ante uncertainty, in the sense that these disclosures help investors estimate the dispersion of secondary market values. Our paper contributes to the empirical accounting literature by documenting an association between voluntary disclosure and what is arguably the foremost cost of raising initial equity capital (i.e., IPO underpricing).

Much of the production in firms takes place over time. This paper seeks to understand the value of interim performance information on long projects. In particular, the model explores the sorting effects of performance evaluations. Conducting an interim performance evaluation increases efficiency by providing the option to end projects with low early returns. The main result: It is efficient to allocate more resources towards the end of a project. This result holds under a variety of scenarios: when the worker has unknown ability, when the outside options vary with output, and even under an agency framework with a risk‐averse agent.

An important problem facing managers is how to enhance the credibility, or believability, of their earnings forecasts. In this paper, we experimentally test whether a characteristic of a management earnings forecast—namely, whether it is disaggregated—can affect its credibility. We also test whether disaggregation moderates the relation between managerial incentives and forecast credibility. Disaggregated forecasts include an earnings forecast as well as forecasts of other key line items comprising that earnings forecast. Our results indicate that disaggregated forecasts are judged to be more credible than aggregated ones and that disaggregation works to counteract the effect of high incentives. We also develop and test an original model that explains how disaggregation positively impacts three factors that, in turn, influence forecast credibility: perceived precision of management's beliefs, perceived clarity of the forecast, and perceived financial reporting quality. We show that forecast disaggregation works to remedy incentive problems only via its effect on perceived financial reporting quality. Overall, our study adds to our understanding of how managers can credibly communicate their expectations about the future to market participants.

We examine the determinants and the informativeness of financial analysts' risk ratings using a large sample of research reports issued by Salomon Smith Barney, now Citigroup, over the period 1997–2003. We find that the cross‐sectional variation in risk ratings is largely explained by variables commonly viewed as measures of risk, such as idiosyncratic risk, size, book‐to‐market, and leverage. In addition, earnings‐based measures of risk, such as earnings quality and accounting losses, also contribute to explaining the cross‐sectional variation in the risk ratings. Finally, we document that the risk ratings can be used to predict future return volatility after controlling for other predictors of future volatility. We conclude that analysts play an important role as providers of information about investment risk.

This study examines firm performance surrounding insiders' prepaid variable forward (PVF) transactions to infer insiders' information when they enter these off‐market contracts. PVFs allow insiders to hedge downside risk, share performance gains, and obtain immediate large‐sum cash payments for investment or consumption. On average, PVF transactions cover 30% of a sample insider's firm‐specific wealth ($22 million), which is substantially larger than a typical open‐market sale. PVFs systematically follow strong firm performance and precede degraded stock and earnings performance. PVFs also precede periods of negative abnormal returns relative to potential alternative investments. The documented association between PVFs and performance declines does not appear to result from the market's response to transaction disclosure, participant self‐selection, or general price reversals. Thus, evidence suggests that insiders use PVFs to diversify firm‐specific holdings in anticipation of performance declines.

This paper studies the incentive effects of a balanced scorecard within a multitask agency framework under both formal and relational contracts. First, the main characteristics of the balanced scorecard are analyzed with respect to performance measure congruity. It is shown that under complete verifiability, a properly designed balanced scorecard is capable of perfectly aligning the interests of owners and employees by means of an explicit contract. I then investigate whether subjective performance evaluation is beneficial when not all the scorecard measures are contractible. It emerges that congruity of the contractible scorecard measures constrains a purely implicit incentive contract, but the first‐best solution may still be obtained through a combination of formal and relational contracts. Furthermore, a purely explicit contract in most cases can be improved by incorporating subjective rewards.

Managers play earnings surprise games to avoid negative earnings surprises by managing earnings upward or by managing analysts' earnings expectations downward. We investigate the effectiveness of the financial reporting process at restraining earnings surprise games. Because the annual reporting process is subject to an independent audit and more rigorous expense recognition rules than interim reporting, it provides managers with fewer opportunities to manage earnings upward. We document that, relative to interim reporting, annual reporting reduces the likelihood of income‐increasing earnings management and, to a lesser extent, of negative surprise avoidance, but increases the magnitude of downward expectations management. Our findings suggest that regulatory attempts to monitor corporations' internal checks and balances are likely to be more effective at curbing upward earnings management than at mitigating negative surprise avoidance.

We explore the factors associated with historical IPO failures by developing an IPO failure prediction model that includes accounting information as well as proxies for the role of information intermediaries and other IPO deal–related characteristics. We document statistically significant differences in failure models applicable to nontech versus high tech IPOs, and these structural differences are largely driven by accounting‐based proxies for firms' investments in intangible assets, operating performance, and financial leverage. We also develop parsimonious, predominantly accounting‐based, strictly out‐of‐sample (i.e., no hindsight) IPO failure forecasting models for each of the two sectors. We find that our forecasts are negatively associated with one‐year post‐IPO abnormal returns. A pseudo‐hedge strategy of going short (long) in high (low) failure risk portfolios yields returns of economically significant magnitudes over the one‐year horizon, and is robust to alternative returns methodologies. Further results suggest that IPO long‐run returns anomalies may persist, but they take different forms for high‐tech and nontech IPOs.