Minnis, Sutherland, and Vetter (MSV) documents a sharp decline in lenders’ collection of attested financial statements (including unqualified audits, reviews, and compilations) over the period 2002 to 2017. They attribute this change to lenders adopting new technology and new non-bank lenders entering the lending market. In this discussion, I explore several dimensions of their findings. First, I provide a framework for usefulness of financial statement information in debt contracting. Using this framework, I consider how financial statements may be useful for the small and medium loans the authors study, and how this role could be disrupted. Second, I consider how financial technology (FinTech) has disrupted traditional lending and potentially changed the role of financial statements. Finally, I consider the implications for this change on the accounting profession

I examine how credit reporting affects where firms access credit and how lenders contract with them. I use within firm-time and lender-time tests that exploit lenders joining a credit bureau and sharing information in a staggered pattern. I find information sharing reduces relationship-switching costs, particularly for firms that are young, small, or have had no defaults. After sharing, lenders transition away from relationship contracting, in two ways: contract maturities in new relationships are shorter, and lenders are less willing to provide financing to their delinquent borrowers. My results highlight the mixed effects of transparency-improving financial technologies on credit availability