Knowledge that Transforms

The municipal bond market has long been criticized for its lack of disclosure, which prior research often attributes to weak regulatory oversight. We offer another explanation: tax clienteles. Most municipal bonds are tax-exempt, and thus primarily attract high-tax retail investors, who may lack the incentive or ability to demand or monitor disclosures. In contrast, taxable bonds attract a broader investor base, including institutional investors who can demand disclosure. We find that issuers provide more continuing disclosures in years with taxable bonds outstanding relative to years without. Issuers also increase disclosures after issuing their first taxable bond and decrease disclosures after calling their last taxable bond. Exploiting a tax law change, we find that disclosures increase following plausibly exogenous increases in taxable bond issuances. Our results suggest that the tax clienteles for municipal bonds affect issuers’ disclosure practices and can inform those concerned with disclosure noncompliance in the municipal bond market.

ABSTRACT This study investigates whether auditors incorporate investor information demand when determining key audit matter (KAM) disclosures. We measure investor information demand using a unique dataset of investor inquiries submitted through investor interactive platforms (IIPs) established by the China Securities Regulatory Commission. At the topic level, we find that auditors are more likely to disclose a given topic as a KAM when investors raise more inquiries on that topic. At the aggregate level, a higher proportion of inquiries devoted to accounting issues is associated with both a greater number of KAMs and longer KAM disclosures. Importantly, following the introduction of KAM reporting, managers’ footnote disclosures become more aligned with heightened investor inquiries, reinforcing our interpretation that the documented effects reflect auditors’ responses to investor inquiries rather than merely mirroring managerial disclosure changes. Overall, our findings suggest that auditors incorporate investor information demand into KAM disclosures.

This study investigates the practice of re-audits—where an incoming audit firm re-audits the prior year’s financial statements previously examined by a predecessor audit firm. We examine the costs and benefits of such re-audits. We find that re-audits are more likely when the risks of misstatement are high and when incoming auditors can expect to win more clients by identifying material misstatements overlooked by predecessor auditors. Our results show that incoming auditors who perform re-audits are more successful in winning new clients from predecessor auditors. Moreover, re-audits result in significantly more restatements. However, consistent with the resource-intensive nature of re-audits, we also find that they are associated with longer audit delays and higher audit fees. Overall, we conclude that re-audits have important consequences for financial statement users, incoming auditors, and predecessor auditors.