We examine the dynamics of bond correlation using a broad sample of US corporate bonds, and document that bond correlation varies heavily over time. We attribute this variation in bond correlation to variation in risk factor correlation reflecting time-varying flight-to-quality behavior of investors. We show that risk factor correlation increases when investor sentiment worsens, i.e., corporate bond investors exhibit stronger flight-to-quality when their sentiment is bad. Thus, bad investor sentiment leads to flight-to-quality behavior and, ultimately, high bond correlation. Very good sentiment, in contrast, can cause risk factor correlation and bond correlation to be negative.

Firms’ competitive advantages are unsustainable when competitors hire their employees away to study and recreate those advantages. We document inter-firm knowledge spillovers through labor mobility in the mutual fund industry, which result in performance improvement at the recipient family. This effect intensifies when frictions hampering knowledge absorption at the recipient family are weaker and switching managers had better access to the organization processes at the originating family. Performance deterioration at the originating family, which intensifies when more money chases the newly-transferred knowledge, suggests erosion of its competitive advantage and wealth transfers across investors in the respective families.

This study examines how the efficiency of trading desks operated by mutual fund families affects portfolio performance and investment behavior of affiliated funds. We estimate the trading efficiency of a fund family's trading desk as the difference between the gross return of the family's index fund, which incorporates trading costs, and the return of the underlying index, which does not incorporate trading costs, around index adjustment dates. By operating more efficient trading desks that help reduce trading costs, fund families improve the performance of their funds significantly and also enable their funds to trade more and hold less liquid portfolios.

We investigate the term structure of bond market illiquidity premia and show that the term structure varies greatly over time. Short and long end are strictly separated suggesting that different economic factors drive different parts of the term structure. We propose a stylized theoretical model which implies that current trading needs of investors determine the short end. The long-term risk of being forced to liquidate bond positions determines the long end. Empirical evidence supports these predictions. While short-term liquidation risk captured by asset market volatilities drives the short end, the long end depends on the long-term economic outlook.

We examine how labor mobility restrictions in the form of non-compete clauses in employment contracts affect employee behavior. Using the mutual fund industry as testing laboratory, we show that fund managers respond to higher job termination costs due to increased enforceability of non-compete clauses by increasing their contribution to their employer's revenue. They do so by improving their fund performance, while also increasing window dressing to attract new customers and increase fee revenue. Furthermore, the change in incentives disciplines managers’ risk taking, as shown by noticeable reductions in their portfolio risk, portfolio deviations from peers, and engagement in fund tournaments.