We analyze new Swedish data on the portfolio holdings of large blockholders and find that firm value increases with the weight of a stock in a large blockholder's portfolio. In our sample, this weight may be greater than 50%. We are the first to show that this value premium is correlated with portfolio weights for any large blockholders, not just institutions. We find some evidence that indicates that “stock importance” (high portfolio weight) can mitigate the negative effects of a dual-class structure on firm value. Further, it does not seem that a large blockholder's tenure as a CEO or as a board chairman affects this value premium. We conduct a variety of tests to rule out endogeneity and reverse causality.

Using detailed hand-collected data on firm ownership and board cultural diversity from Sweden, we find that foreign ownership is positively associated with board cultural diversity. This relationship is not an artifact of foreign owners joining the board, and it is not driven by firms with substantial foreign focus. The presence of foreign owners on nomination committees seems to be the channel through which foreign owners implement cultural diversity. The positive relationship between foreign ownership and board cultural diversity is also more pronounced in firms where owners may have more say (family firms, dual-class share firms, and firms with concentrated ownership). However, we do not find evidence that cultural diversity increases firm value or that it is correlated with other types of diversity. Our preferred interpretation is quasi-homophily.

We use a unique hand-collected data set covering the entire career path of film directors, who are re-hired (or not) after each and every film project. Film directors manage projects which can cost hundreds of millions of dollars. We examine the inter-temporal dynamics of turnover decisions to disentangle ability revelation from effort incentives and measure the contribution of project managers to project success. We show that the probability of re-hiring is increasing in average returns over an entire career path, rather than just the outcome of the most recent project, supporting an ability revelation interpretation. We also find that promotions are increasing in directors' experience. We create an ability measure for directors, and show that directors can have a significant effect on the financial and critical success of their projects. Our evidence can inform the debate on CEO effects on their firms and projects and contribute to the CEO and executive turnover literature.