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Agency, Delayed Compensation, and the Structure of Executive Remuneration

Journal of Finance 1983 38(5), 1489
In this paper we examine the factors affecting the structure of executives' compensation packages. We focus particularly on the role of various types of delayed compensation as means of “bonding” executives to their firms. The basic problem is to design a compensation package that rewards actions that are in the long-run interest of the stockholders. Firms must take into account their ability to discern unfortunate circumstances from mismanagement, the extent to which a compensation package forces the executive to face risks beyond his control, and the willingness of a given executive to bear this risk. We use our theory to interpret some executive compensation data from the early 1970s.

Agency, Delayed Compensation, and the Structure of Executive Remuneration

Journal of Finance 1983 38(5), 1489-1505 open access
In this paper we examine the factors affecting the structure of executives' compensation packages. We focus particularly on the role of various types of delayed compensation as means of “bonding” executives to their firms. The basic problem is to design a compensation package that rewards actions that are in the long‐run interest of the stockholders. Firms must take into account their ability to discern unfortunate circumstances from mismanagement, the extent to which a compensation package forces the executive to face risks beyond his control, and the willingness of a given executive to bear this risk. We use our theory to interpret some executive compensation data from the early 1970s.

The Impact of Deregulation and Financial Innovation on Consumers: The Case of the Mortgage Market

Journal of Finance 2010 65(1), 333-360
We develop a technique to assess the impact of changes in mortgage markets on households, exploiting an implication of the permanent income hypothesis: The higher a household's expected future income, the higher its desired consumption, ceteris paribus. With perfect credit markets, desired consumption matches actual consumption and current spending forecasts future income. Because credit market imperfections mute this effect, the extent to which house spending predicts future income measures the “imperfectness” of mortgage markets. Using micro‐data, we find that since the early 1980s, mortgage markets have become less imperfect in this sense, and securitization has played an important role.