Knowledge that Transforms

In this paper a combined capital asset pricing model and option pricing model is considered and then applied to the derivation of equity's value and its systematic risk. In the first section we develop the two models and present some newly found properties of the option pricing model. The second section is concerned with the effects of these properties on the securityholders of firms with less than perfect ‘me first’ rules. We show how unanticipated changes in firm capital and asset structures can differentially affect the firm's debt and equity. In the final section of the paper we consider a number of theoretical and empirical implications of the joint model. These include investment policy as well as the causes and effects of non-stationarity in the systematic risk of levered equity and risky debt.

The validity of the classic Black-Scholes option pricing formula depends on the capability of investors to follow a dynamic portfolio strategy in the stock that replicates the payoff structure to the option. The critical assumption required for such a strategy to be feasible, is that the underlying stock return dynamics can be described by a stochastic process with a continuous sample path. In this paper, an option pricing formula is derived for the more-general case when the underlying stock returns are generated by a mixture of both continuous and jump processes. The derived formula has most of the attractive features of the original Black-Scholes formula in that it does not depend on investor preferences or knowledge of the expected return on the underlying stock. Moreover, the same analysis applied to the options can be extended to the pricing of corporate liabilities.

This paper discusses general principles for choosing bank assets and liabilities, for deciding on when to make a loan and what interest rate to charge, for pricing funds transfer services such as the handling of checks, for establishing compensating balance requirements, and for dealing with government regulation. The discussion assumes markets are efficient and deals first with an unregulated environment and then with policies in the face of regulatory constraints. Most of the policies which would be optimal in an unregulated environment will be optimal in the regulated environment such as in the U.S. today, because it is relatively easy to get around most of the regulations that are applied to banks by the use of non-deposit liabilities, compensating balances and negative checking accounts.

The paper studies both the initial and aftermarket performance (measured by risk-adjusted returns) on newly issued common stocks which were offered to the public during the 1960s. The results confirm that average initial performance is positive (11.4 percent), while the distribution of returns is skewed so that the subscriber of a single random new issue offering has about an equal chance for gain or loss. The results are generally consistent with aftermarket efficiency. Positive initial performance along with aftermarket efficiency indicate that new issue offerings are underpriced. The paper provides insights into this underpricing mystery, but does not solve it.

The principle of stochastic dominance is used to characterize the optimal efficient sets when the distributions of the random prospects belong to a family. Most of the well-known distributions are considered. In each case, the optimal efficient sets are characterized by easily verifiable conditions on the parameters of the distributions. These optimal efficient sets are then compared with the corresponding mean-variance (MV) efficient set. It is often found that the optimal efficient sets are proper subsets of the MV efficient set. Thus, the MV criterion is a proper efficiency criterion, but the MV efficient set can be excessively large compared to the optimal efficient set.

Owners of capital frequently lack knowledge about investment opportunities. One alternative is to turn to a manager for assistance. The owner's problem of contracting for the services of a manager is treated as a problem in buying information. The surprising result is that it is sometimes possible to trade information even when the owner is unable to form his own assessment of the information's value. Under some conditions it is possible to write a managerial compensation contract which will induce the manager to act in the best interests of the owner. These conditions require owner knowledge of the manager's employment and investment alternatives and risk preferences as well as some, but not all, of the characteristics of the investment opportunities.

The effect of a syndicate's uncertainty regarding the demand for a new bond issue on the syndicate's choice of an offer and bid price, and on the spread between those two prices, is analyzed. Then, the impact of uncertainty on the spread is empirically tested. The hypothesis that the spread varies inversely with the number of bidders for an issue is also developed and tested, and several other hypothesized determinants of the spread are examined.

This paper examines the robustness of one month treasury bills as predictors of inflation. The evidence is inconsistent with the joint hypothesis that (1) the expected real rate of interest was constant for one-month bills and (2) that markets are efficient with regard to the time series of inflation. When the expected real rate of interest is set equal to the conditional expectation given the time series of real rates, the results are much more consistent with the efficient markets model. In more positive terms, the failure to confirm market efficiency appears to be the result of naive estimates of the expected real rate.