Knowledge that Transforms

We study the behavior of a financial institution subject to capital requirements based on self-reported VaR measures, as in the Basel Committee's Internal Models Approach. We view these capital requirements and the associated backtesting procedure as a mechanism designed to induce financial institutions to reveal the risk of their investments and to support this risk with adequate levels of capital. Accordingly, we consider the simultaneous choice of an optimal dynamic reporting and investment strategy. Overall, we find that VaR-based capital requirements can be very effective not only in curbing portfolio risk but also in inducing revelation of this risk.

We generate estimates of the costs of broad-based stock option programs under varying assumptions about why firms use these pay schemes. We show that, if accounting considerations alone drive option grants, a typical firm in our sample incurs between 50 cents and one dollar of real costs in order to increase reported pre-tax net income by one dollar. This cost is reduced, but is still quite substantial, if accounting leads firms to grant options rather than restricted stock. We also show that, if option grants are efficient, the patterns in our data are consistent with firms using these grants to attract and retain employees.

Recently, calendar spread futures, futures contracts whose underlying asset is the difference of two futures contracts with different delivery dates, have been successfully introduced for a number of financial futures contracts traded on the Chicago Board of Trade. A spread futures contract is not an obvious financial innovation, as it is a derivative on a derivative security: a spread futures position can be replicated by taking positions in the two underlying futures contracts, both of which may already be quite liquid. This paper provides a motivation for this innovation, demonstrating how the introduction of spread futures can, by changing the relative trading patterns of hedgers and informed traders, affect equilibrium bid–ask spreads, improve hedger welfare, and potentially improve market-maker expected profits. These results are robust both to allowing serial correlation of asset price changes, and investor preference for skewness.

We investigate the relation between price discreteness and the number of dealers in a dealer market. We present a model featuring a finite number of dealers competing in prices for supplying liquidity to a forthcoming market order. We find that a decrease in tick size benefits dealers and tends to hurt investors when the number of dealers for a stock is small. In contrast, a decrease in tick size hurts dealers and benefits investors when the number of dealers is large. This result yields several new empirical implications relating a change in tick size to entry and exit of dealers, order aggressiveness and transaction rates.

Speculators who prey on hedgers can stifle financial innovation in the sense that new markets can fail. In this paper I analyze whether a profit maximizing exchange nonetheless chooses to open markets for speculative securities and if so, how to circumvent the problem of market failure. I find that the optimal financial innovation takes two forms. The first is a market structure consisting of hedge instruments, traded in low volume at stable asset prices. The second is a market structure consisting of speculative instruments, traded in greater volume at volatile asset prices. These strategies are derived within the same framework where the cost and the quality of the speculators' information set and the hedgers risk aversion ultimately determine which is the optimal one.