Knowledge that Transforms

We study the optimal joint design of prudential supervision and deposit guarantee regulations in a multi-country, integrated banking market, where policy-makers have preferences regarding profitability and stability of the banking sector. Non-coordinated policies will tend to yield too little supervision and too much deposit insurance. The paper concludes with recommendations on policy priorities in this area.

This paper investigates whether securities class actions (SCAs) can play a role in banking supervision, both as a warning signal of insolvency and as an instrument of market discipline to encourage bank managers to carefully evaluate risk. Two groups of US banks are compared over the 2000–2008 period. One includes banks that have faced at least one SCA, while the other is composed of non-targeted banks (control group). Results indicate that collective private litigation procedures are more frequently directed at financially fragile intermediaries exhibiting inadequate governance standards. Furthermore, banks which have been subjected to SCAs are likely to reduce their excessive risk positions. This supports the idea that SCAs could be efficiently employed as a complement to public supervisory activity in the banking sector.

The purpose of this paper is to assess the choice between adopting a monetary base or an interest rate setting instrument to maintain financial stability. Our results suggest that the interest rate instrument is preferable, since during times of a panic or financial crisis the Central Bank automatically satisfies the increased demand for money. Thus, it prevents sharp losses in asset values and enhanced asset volatility.

This paper analyzes the effect of the business cycle on the regulatory capital buffers of German local banks in the period 1993–2004. The capital buffers are found to fluctuate countercyclically over the business cycle. The evidence supports that low-capitalized banks do not catch up with their well-capitalized peers over the observation period and they do not decrease risk-weighted assets during a recession. This finding suggests that their low capitalization does not force them to retreat from lending.

This paper is the first in the literature to examine the determinants of US credit card penalty fees. Many critics of credit card fees – including a number of US Senators – have argued that credit card penalty fees reflect banks’ market share. Using a unique data set we find that fees are increasing in customer risk which supports the position of defenders of penalty fees, such as banks. However, our finding that fees are increasing in a bank's market share is consistent with the concerns expressed by politicians and regulators. We also find card penalty fees are direct substitutes for card interest rates.

This study investigates whether regulations have an independent effect on bank risk-taking or whether their effect is channeled through the market power possessed by banks. Given a well-established set of theoretical priors, the regulations considered are capital requirements, restrictions on bank activities and official supervisory power. We use data from the Central and Eastern European banking sectors over the period 1998–2005. The empirical results suggest that banks with market power tend to take on lower credit risk and have a lower probability of default. Capital requirements reduce risk in general, but for banks with market power this effect significantly weakens or can even be reversed. Higher activity restrictions in combination with more market power reduce both credit risk and the risk of default, while official supervisory power has only a direct impact on bank risk.

We analyse the effect of failing reinsurance cover on the stability of Dutch insurers. As insurers often reinsure themselves with other (re)insurers, a firm's loss could spread contagiously through the sector. Using a unique and confidential data set on reinsurance exposures, we gain insight into the reinsurance market structure and perform a scenario analysis to measure contagion risks. Considering entities on a standalone basis, we find no evidence of systemic risk in the Netherlands, even if multiple reinsurance companies fail simultaneously. At group level our analysis points to the contagion risk of in-house reinsurance structures, given that such in-house reinsurance parties are generally not higher capitalised than other group members.

Researchers increasingly turn to counterfactual simulations to estimate the danger of contagion owing to exposures in the interbank loan market. This paper summarises the findings of such simulations, provides a critical assessment of the modelling assumptions on which they are based, and discusses their use in financial stability analysis. On the whole, such simulations suggest that contagious defaults are unlikely but cannot be fully ruled out, at least in some countries. If contagion does take place, then it could lead to the breakdown of a substantial fraction of the banking system, thus imposing high costs to society. However, when interpreting these results, one has to bear in mind the potential bias caused by the very strong assumptions underlying the simulations. Robustness tests indicate that the models might be able to correctly predict whether or not contagion could be an issue and, possibly, also identify banks whose failure could give rise to contagion. They are, however, less suited for stress testing or for the analysis of policy options in crises, primarily due to their lack of behavioural foundations.

In Australia, the 1890s depression was associated with a banking system collapse, whereas financial problems during the 1930s depression were far less severe. While the behaviour of the financial sector was obviously pro-cyclical during the 1890s episode, there were signs of more prudent behaviour and stronger financial institutions leading up to the 1930s depression. This change was aided by a change in the competitive environment and by the experience of the preceding financial crisis. The lessons from Australia's depression experiences are of relevance to debates about the causes of the current global financial crisis and required regulatory reforms.

This paper discusses the problems exposed by the global financial crisis in the areas of financial regulation and supervision and possible solutions. It describes and evaluates current proposals regarding the role of the central bank as a systemic regulator, the pros and the cons of locating financial supervision in the central bank, and the conflicts and synergies that such an arrangement entails. Once a crisis erupts, central bank liquidity injections constitute a first line of defense. But in the longer term these injections create a trade-off between price and financial stability, and may compromise central bank independence. Problems exposed by the crisis include the growth of a poorly regulated shadow financial system, shortermism in executive compensation packages and consequent adverse incentive effects, the too-big-to-fail problem, procyclicality in the behavior of financial institutions, conflicts of interest in the rating agencies industry and the trade-off between the scope of intermediation through securitization and transparency in the valuation of assets. The paper also discusses international dimensions including international cooperation in regulatory reform and the scope for limiting exchange rate variability. The conclusion points out inherent difficulties in distinguishing ex ante between a fundamentals based expansion and a “bubble.”