Knowledge that Transforms

Financial markets embed expectations of central bank policy into asset prices. This paper compares two approaches that extract a probability density of market beliefs. The first is a simulated moments estimator for option volatilities described in [Mizrach, B., 2002. When Did the Smart Money in Enron Lose Its’ Smirk? Rutgers University Working Paper #2002-24]; the second is a new approach developed by [Haas, M., Mittnik, S., Paolella, M.S., 2004a. Mixed normal conditional heteroskedasticity, J. Financial Econ. 2, 211–250] for fat-tailed conditionally heteroskedastic time series. In an application to the 1992–1993 European Exchange Rate Mechanism crises, we find that both the options and the underlying exchange rates provide useful information for policy makers.

This paper examines interactions between monetary policy and financial stability. There is a general view that central banks smooth interest rate changes to enhance the stability of financial markets. But might this induce a moral hazard problem, and induce financial institutions to maintain riskier portfolios, the presence of which would further inhibit active monetary policy? Hedging activities of financial institutions, such as the use of interest rate futures and swap markets to reduce risk, should further protect markets against consequences of unforeseen interest rate changes. Thus, smoothing may be both unnecessary and undesirable. The paper shows by a theoretical argument that smoothing interest rates may lead to indeterminacy of the economy's rational expectations equilibrium. Nevertheless, our empirical analysis supports the view that the Federal Reserve smoothes interest rates and reacts to interest rate futures. We add new evidence on the importance for policy of alternative indicators of financial markets stress.

We discuss the thorny issue of how to define financial stability, and conclude that the best approach is to define the characteristics of an episode of financial instability, and to define financial stability as a state of affairs in which episodes of instability are unlikely to occur. We then discuss public policies to achieve financial stability, distinguishing between preventive and remedial measures, and explore the costs and benefits of such policies. We conclude with some comments on current issues in financial regulation, including Basel 2.

This paper reviews the state-of-the-art of macro stress-testing methodologies. We assess the progress made both in the econometric analysis of balance sheet indicators and in the simulation of value-at-risk measures to assess system-wide vulnerabilities. To illustrate the main analytical approaches in the literature, we estimate two different models for stress-testing purposes using data for Finland over the time period from 1986 to 2003. The Finnish experience in the early 1990s appears particularly suited for macro stress-testing as it includes a severe recession with significantly higher-than-average default rates and banks’ loan losses. We highlight a number of methodological challenges that still remain concerning in particular the correlation of market and credit risks over time and across institutions, the limited time horizon generally used for macro stress-testing and the potential instability of reduced-form parameter estimates because of feedback effects.

In this paper, we study credit risk transfer (CRT) in an economy with endogenous financing (by both banks and non-bank institutions). Our analysis suggests that the incentive of banks to transfer credit risk is aligned with the regulatory objective of improving stability, and so the recent development of credit derivative instruments is to be welcomed. Moreover, we find the transfer of credit risk from banks to non-banks to be more beneficial than CRT within the banking sector. Intuitively, this is because it allows for the shedding of aggregate risk which must otherwise remain within the relatively more fragile banking sector. Therefore, regulators should act to maximize the benefits from CRT by encouraging the development of instruments favorable to the cross-sectoral transfer of aggregate credit risk (including basket credit derivatives such as collateralized debt obligations). Finally, we derive the optimal regulatory stance for banks relative to non-bank financial institutions. We show that a level playing field approach is sub-optimal. Regulatory stances should be set to actively encourage cross-sector CRT, first because of the higher fragility of the banking sector and second to induce banks to incur the costs of CRT which otherwise lead them to undertake an insufficient amount of CRT.

The focus of this article is the debt market as a powerful disciplinarian source for large and complex banking organizations around the world. We empirically study the interactions between reinforcing banks’ market discipline and preserving a level playing field in international banking. Our approach consists of conducting cross-country comparisons of the secondary market prices sensitivity to market measures of bank risk (traditional and financial strength ratings). The results are generally consistent with the market discipline paradigm. However, much progress still needs to be made (especially in Japan and certain European countries) in order to make the level playing field principle compatible with the reinforcement of market discipline on an international level.

In the U.S., as in most countries with well-developed securities markets, derivative securities enjoy special protections under insolvency resolution laws. Most creditors are “stayed” from enforcing their rights while a firm is in bankruptcy. However, many derivatives contracts are exempt from these stays. Furthermore, derivatives enjoy netting and closeout, or termination, privileges which are not always available to most other creditors. The primary argument used to motivate passage of legislation granting these extraordinary protections is that derivatives markets are a major source of systemic risk in financial markets and that netting and closeout reduce this risk. To date, these assertions have not been subjected to rigorous economic scrutiny. This paper critically re-examines this hypothesis. These relationships are more complex than often perceived. We conclude that it is not clear whether netting, collateral, and/or closeout lead to reduced systemic risk, once the impact of these protections on the size and structure of the derivatives market has been taken into account.

I consider problem bank loans as the outcome of decisions made by banks in the dual role they serve as financial intermediaries. This dual role necessarily introduces conflicts of interest that can lead to bank mismanagement and consequently problem bank loans. Because bank activities take place within the tangible and intangible structure of institutions, institutions may affect the quality of bank loans. I consider legal, political, sociological, economic, and banking institutions and explore their contribution to problem bank loans. I find support that a variety of institutions impact the share of bank assets that are non-performing.

This paper compares performance of domestic and foreign banks in Malaysia during the Asian crisis. We find that foreign banks were not a homogeneous group: while banks with a stronger regional focus suffered from the crisis as much as domestic banks, foreign banks not focused on Asia performed significantly better. The key difference appears to be exposure to sectors hurt by the bursting of the asset price bubble. Availability of support from parent banks, likelihood of being bailed out, or political connections do not seem to explain the differences. Theories of managerial herding may explain why non-regional foreign banks were not caught in the financial bubble.