Knowledge that Transforms

Intensifying climate change makes protection against natural disaster risk – either through ex ante insurance or ex post aid – a first-order public policy issue. Flood risk protection in the U.S. traditionally featured ex post aid through FEMA and heavily subsidized insurance through the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP). In an effort to correct subsidy-induced overbuilding and under-mitigation in flood-prone areas, the NFIP recently moved to actuarially fair insurance premiums. But this change has two unintended consequences: a fiscal spillover onto FEMA disaster aid as insurance coverage declines in flood-prone areas, and household exposure to uninsurable reclassification risk from uncertain climate projections. We develop a model of optimal flood insurance that incorporates the static and dynamic tradeoffs of subsidizing premiums. We then use a variety of identification strategies and data to estimate the five key parameters needed to implement this model. We find that the fiscal spillover and reclassification risk protection benefits significantly outweigh the moral hazard costs, and that the optimal subsidy to flood insurance is 51%, comparable to the level of subsidization before the recent reform.

This paper studies how new varieties enter markets and become locally available. We provide causal evidence of demand externalities that operate in two steps. First, information about new varieties diffuses directly through real-world social ties among consumers. Second, early purchases generate an indirect spillover to firms: local retailers learn from “pioneer” consumers which new varieties are most likely to succeed and adjust their product offerings accordingly. We study this process in the context of direct-to-consumer imports. Using customs records on individuals’ purchases matched to population-wide social networks, international migrant links, and retailer catchment areas, we document economically meaningful demand externalities. Product-specific expenditure shocks abroad transmit through migrant networks and shift which varieties consumers purchase. Leveraging these shocks as a plausibly exogenous source of local demand variation, we show strong peer effects: prior purchases by close neighbors, coworkers, or friends increase an individual’s likelihood of purchasing the same variety, especially for premium and visible goods. We leverage this result to identify an indirect spillover from consumers to firms: retailers are more likely to add a variety to their assortment when it becomes popular among consumers in their catchment area. Combining the instrument with linked consumer–retailer data and a self-conducted retailer survey, we show that this response reflects learning about latent demand for varieties not yet stocked locally. Together, social diffusion and retailer learning generate demand multipliers that reshape local product availability and expand access to global variety.

We propose a tractable model in which risk, at both the micro and macro levels, is endogenous and driven by incentives. In the model, each firm chooses the mean and the variance of its productivity process, as well as how it covaries with the productivity of other firms. Aggregate risk arises when firms select productivity processes that are correlated with one another. The theory predicts that larger firms and those with lower markups are less volatile and less correlated with aggregate productivity. We find support for these predictions in the data. Through their impact on risk-taking decisions, distortions such as taxes and markups can make GDP more volatile in equilibrium. In a calibrated version of the model, removing distortions significantly reduces GDP volatility.

School assignment policies are a key lever for expanding access to high-performing schools and promoting racial and socioeconomic integration. For over 50 years, the Metropolitan Council for Educational Opportunity (METCO) has bussed students of color from Boston, Massachusetts, to relatively wealthier and predominantly white suburbs. I estimate the effects of attending a high-performing suburban school by comparing applicants who receive enrollment offers with applicants who do not. A two-stage least squares approach exploits waitlist assignment priorities and controls for a rich set of characteristics from birth records and application data. Attending a suburban school boosts math and English test scores, reduces dropout, and increases on-time high school graduation. Four-year college aspirations, enrollment, and graduation increase along with earnings in adulthood. Students whose parents did not attend college and boys experience the largest effects. The evidence points to several mechanisms, including access to higher value-added schools, higher-achieving peers, and schools with stronger college-going norms. Participants are more likely to be tracked into lower-performing classes, implying that effects could be larger with access to more advanced coursework. District value-added estimates suggest that students’ educational trajectories shift at least as much as they would from growing up in the suburban districts.

This paper provides evidence on how wage inequality among workers affects the labor movement using three complementary research designs: a vignette experiment with union organizers, a natural policy experiment that increased wage inequality among Wisconsin school teachers, and an information intervention during the 2023 Writers Guild of America strike. Across all studies, we find that inequality undermines union strength through multiple channels. First, workers with high individual bargaining power are more likely to withdraw support in unequal environments, preferring individual over collective bargaining. Second, union organizers facing hypothetical choices strategically respond to inequality in ways that may preserve membership but limit redistribution, such as shifting their campaign away from wages and choosing smaller, more homogeneous bargaining units.

This paper constructs the first global dataset on inter-sectoral capital service expenditures. I use this data to disaggregate capital services and intermediate inputs in a dynamic multi-sector trade model. Steady state allocations and responses to shocks are determined by a capital-augmented global input-output matrix. Two properties of the measured network deliver larger long-run consumption gains from globalization than existing estimates, as well as larger gains in more capital-intensive countries. First, more trade-exposed sectors supply capital to more consumption-influential producers. Second, heterogeneity in the network reallocates sectoral expenditures towards producers with larger declines in capital rental prices. These reallocations raise capital incomes and lower consumption price indices.

Information often spreads and influences beliefs regardless of its reliability. We show that this occurs in part because indicators of reliability tend to be lost in the process of word-of-mouth transmission. We conduct controlled experiments where participants listen to economic forecasts and pass them on through voice messages. Other participants listen either to original or transmitted audio recordings and report incentivized beliefs. Across various transmitter incentive schemes, a claim’s reliability is lost in transmission much more than the claim itself. Reliable and unreliable information, once filtered through transmission, impact listener beliefs similarly. Mechanism experiments show that reliability is lost not because it is perceived as less relevant or harder to transmit, but because it is less likely to come to mind during transmission. Evidence from our experiments, a large corpus of everyday conversations, and economic TV news shows that contextual cues can bring reliability to mind and induce its transmission, but situations in which people share information seldom contain such cues.

We explore the mechanics of empathy. We show that information about an outgroup can activate and magnify empathy when presented in conjunction with an experience simulating their struggles. This response increases the willingness to help the struggling group. We provide evidence for this effect in an immersive virtual reality experiment where participants (“witnesses”) experience a simulation of the struggle of unauthorized migrants (“protagonists”), then replicate these results in a series of controlled lab experiments. We show that information enhances the witnesses’ empathetic response and drives them to engage in more prosocial behavior when it increases their perceived interpersonal similarity, or relatability to the protagonist — an effect we trace to attention: eye-tracking data reveals that information provision concentrates witnesses’ gaze on the struggles of the protagonist instead of searching through peripheral elements of the scene. Conversely, only information packages that strengthen perceived relatability — an effect that can vary across subgroups with heterogeneous attributes — magnify empathy. Together, our evidence suggests that the ability to put oneself in the shoes of another person or group can be enhanced by activating empathy through simple, targeted, information provision.

If unions raise worker wages, who pays? We provide a comprehensive assessment of firm responses to increased unionization, using changes in the tax deductibility of union dues in Norway as a quasi-exogenous source of variation in firm-level union density. In the average private sector firm, higher union density raises labor costs and leads firms to contract employment and production, lowering profits without increasing the labor share. The incidence is shared: consumers bear part of the cost through higher prices, shareholders through lower profits, and the remainder is offset by productivity improvements. The total wage bill falls, with losses concentrated among less-attached “outsider” workers. Firm responses vary systematically by the degree of market competition. In manufacturing, where firms operate in less competitive product and labor markets, the response is reversed: the average firm expands employment and production, reduces labor markdowns, and does not experience profit declines. Instead, higher labor costs are largely passed on to consumers through higher prices, with the remainder offset by productivity gains. Workers benefit as both wages and employment rise. These patterns suggest that unions can offset employer monopsony power and that firm responses–and therefore who ultimately bears the cost-depend importantly on market structure. Overall, unionization in this setting primarily redistributes from consumers rather than shareholders and has effects that differ sharply across firms, including a reallocation toward larger and more productive firms. We rationalize these patterns using a partial-equilibrium model of union bargaining with product- and labor-market power.

Motivated by recent concerns surrounding the use of third-party pricing algorithms by competing firms, we study repeated Bertrand competition where market demand or the cost of serving the market is observed by an intermediary (or “algorithm”) that selectively discloses demand or cost information to maximize firms’ collusive profit. We show that an upper censorship disclosure policy is optimal, which leads to price rigidity and supra-monopoly prices in some states. Improving the algorithm’s accuracy reduces expected consumer surplus whenever it does so under monopoly pricing. When the state is positively correlated over time, the algorithm discloses more information when recent demand was lower or costs were higher. The analysis extends to a generalized model that accommodates product differentiation and capacity constraints. We relate our findings to recent antitrust cases.