Knowledge that Transforms

This paper tests a straightforward implication of the basic Life Cycle model of consumption: that current consumption depends on expected lifetime income. The paper projects future income for a panel of households and finds that consumption is closely related to projected current income, but unrelated to predictable changes in income. However, future income uncertainty has an important effect: consumers facing greater income uncertainty consume less. The results are consistent with "buffer-stock" models of consumption like those of Deaton [1991] or Carroll [1992a, 1992b], where precautionary motives greatly reduce the willingness of prudent consumers to consume out of uncertain future income.

We study the problem of financial contracting and renegotiation between a firm and outside investors when the firm cannot commit to future payouts, but assets can be contracted upon. We show that a capital structure with multiple investors specializing in short-term and long-term claims is superior to a structure with only one type of claim, because this hardens the incentives for the entrepreneur to renegotiate the contract ex post. Depending on the parameters, the optimal capital structure also differentiates between state-independent and state-dependent longterm claims, which can be interpreted as long-term debt and equity.

This paper analyzes the ways in which financially distressed firms try to avoid bankruptcy through public and private debt restructurings, asset sales, mergers, and capital expenditure reductions. Our main finding is that a firm's debt structure affects the way financially distressed firms restructure. The combination of secured private debt and numerous public debt issues seems to impede out-of-court restructurings and increases the probability of a Chapter 11 filing. In addition, we find that, while asset sales are a way of avoiding Chapter 11, they are limited by industry factors: firms in distressed and highly leveraged industries are less prone to sell assets.

Michael B. Devereux, Beverly J. Lapham; The Stability of Economic Integration and Endogenous Growth*, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 109, Issue 1, 1

This paper explores the extent to which the incompleteness of contracts can be attributed to their formal nature: the form, usually written, that contracts are required to take to be enforceable in a court of law by legal prescription, common practice, or simply the contracting parties' will. We model the formal nature of state-contingent contracts as the requirement that the mapping from states of the world to the corresponding outcomes must be of an algorithmic nature. It is shown that such algorithmic nature, although by itself is not enough to generate incomplete contracts, when paired with a similar restriction on the contracting parties' selection process yields endogenously incomplete optimal contracts.

In a rational profit-maximizing world, banks should msdntain a credit policy of lending if and only if borrowers have positive net present value projects. Why then are changes in credit policy seemingly correlated with changes in the condition of those demanding credit? This paper argues that rational bank managers with short horizons will set credit policies that influence and are influenced by other banks and demand side conditions. This leads to a theory of low frequency business cycles driven by bank credit policies. Evidence from the banking crisis in New England in the early 1990s is consistent with the assumptions and predictions of the theory.

We present a qualitative and quantitative analysis of the standard growth model modified to include precautionary saving motives and liquidity constraints. We address the impact on the aggregate saving rate, the importance of asset trading to individuals, and the relative inequality of wealth and income distributions.

This paper examines micro data on U. S. manufacturing firms' inventory behavior during different macroeconomic episodes. Much of the analysis focuses on the 1981–1982 recession, which was apparently caused in large part by tight monetary policy. We find that the inventory investment of firms without access to public bond markets is significantly liquidity-constrained during this period. A similar pattern emerges during the 1974–1975 recession, in which tight money also appears to have played a role. In contrast, such liquidity constraints are largely absent during periods of looser monetary policy in the 1970s and 1980s.

This paper uses two-variable autoregressions to characterize transitory com-ponents in GNP and stock prices. Shocks to GNP holding consumption constant are almost entirely transitory, and account for large fractions of the variance of GNP growth. If consumption does not change, consumers must think that any GNP change is transitory. The facts that the consumption/GNP ratio forecasts GNP growth and that consumption is nearly a random walk drive this result. An implication is that consumption provides a good estimate of the "trend " in GNP. Prices and dividends behave similarly shocks to prices holding dividends constant are almost entirely transitory. I.

Incentive contracts often include important subjective components that mitigate incentive distortions caused by imperfect objective measures. This paper explores the combined use of subjective and objective performance measures in (respectively) implicit and explicit incentive contracts. We show that the presence of sufficiently effective explicit contracts can render all implicit contracts infeasible, even those that would otherwise yield the first-best. We also show, however, that in some circumstances objective and subjective measures are complements: neither an explicit nor an implicit contract alone yields positive profit, but an appropriate combination of the two does. Finally, we consider subjective weights on objective measures.